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Iran’s nuclear program has been one of the main controversial topics within the field of 
international relations since the early 1980s. From that time to 2010, Western states, 
particularly the United States, sought to prevent Iran from developing its program 
through different methods—from sanctions to diplomatic attempts. Despite all these 
efforts, Western states failed to persuade Iran to negotiate its program in a transparent 
manner. When there was no belief in diplomacy, two emerging powers, Turkey and 
Brazil, convinced Iran to come to the table. Due to the skepticism of the great 
international powers, this attempt also failed, but it continued to mean more than a deal 
for Turkey and Brazil.  
This thesis assesses the significance of 2010 Iran-Turkey-Brazil nuclear deal for 
Turkey and Brazil, and finds that Turkey and Brazil engaged in the deal because both of 
them had political and economic motivations. To understand the conditions that led 
Turkey and Brazil to engage in the deal, this study examines the evolution of Turkish and 
Brazilian foreign policies. Then, it focuses on the 2010 nuclear deal’s political and 
economic significance for Turkey and for Brazil. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
On May 17, 2010, Iran, for the first time, agreed to come to the table to negotiate 
its nuclear program. To the world’s surprise, two middle powers, Turkey and Brazil, 
convinced Iran to “ship 1,200 kg of its low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Turkey in return 
for nuclear fuel rods for a medical research reactor.”1 Moreover, Turkey and Brazil not 
only persuaded Iran to negotiate its nuclear program but also convinced Iran to accept the 
same conditions previously offered by the United States and other great powers seven 
months before. Right after the declaration of the success of the deal, however, the United 
States and other Western countries declared their skepticism about it and announced that 
they would not recognize it. It was Turkey and Brazil’s turn to be surprised, because both 
countries’ foreign ministers declared that the United States was aware of all the details of 
the deal from the beginning. Furthermore, Brazil’s Foreign Minister Celso Amorim wrote 
an article in which he stated that the United States wanted both countries to engage in this 
deal.2  
Despite the failure of the deal, which was followed by a fourth round of UN 
sanctions for Iran, it represents a turning point for Turkey and Brazil’s foreign policies. In 
assessing the significance of that deal for Turkey and Brazil, this thesis will attempt to 
answer the following research questions:  
• Does the Turkish-Brazilian nuclear weapons deal offered to Iran in 2010 
reflect the aspirations of contemporary Turkish and Brazilian 
policymakers?  
• Is the deal symptomatic of current foreign policy trends/approaches in 
Ankara and Brasilia? 
• Why is the deal significant for Turkey and Brazil? 
1 Julian Borger, “Iran-Turkey Nuclear Swap Deal ‘Means New Sanctions Are Unnecessary’,” 
Guardian, May 17, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/17/iran-nuclear-uranium-swap-
turkey. 
2 Celso Amorim, “Seguranca Internacional: Novos Desafios para o Brasil,” [International Security: 
New Challenges for Brazil] Contexto Internacional 35, no 1 (January-June 2013): 305. 
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B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Twenty years ago, neither Turkey nor Brazil had a foreign policy independent of 
NATO or U.S. policies. In the last decade, Turkey and Brazil have established 
independent policies and acted independently on a wide range of issues. Two countries 
that historically had nothing to do with one another, Turkey and Brazil came together and 
made an independent stand on nuclear weapons, which was unprecedented. The deal’s 
symbolic meaning is more important than any other consequences for both states. It is 
symptomatic of both countries aspirations to be more proactive, visible, and important.  
This study will focus on its symbolic significance more than the actual policy 
itself. The case of France and French foreign policy perhaps provides a strong analogy 
for these cases. Although France is not a dominant economic actor and does not wield 
inordinate amounts of political or military influence in the world, it is often perceived to 
be an important nation and a major international actor. Turkey and Brazil have been 
crafting their foreign policies to achieve the same level of international influence. 
This study is about the comparison of the development of independent approaches 
toward foreign policy in Brazil and Turkey. It is asking why the proposed nuclear deal 
brokered by Brazil and Turkey is important. Although it failed, the event itself is 
historically significant, and reveals a lot about the ambitions of both nations to develop 
foreign policies independent of the global power elite and based on their interests.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review is divided into three parts. The first two parts give general 
information about historical and current patterns in Turkish and Brazilian foreign 
policies, and the third part deals with specific analyses on the 2010 Iran-Turkey-Brazil 
Nuclear Deal. 
An important goal of this study is to understand how Turkish and Brazilian 
foreign policies have evolved in the last century. That is why this thesis will initially 
analyze historical and current patterns on Turkish and Brazilian foreign policies. It will 
give the historical background that paves the way to understand why Turkey and Brazil 
took part in the nuclear deal with Iran.  
 2 
1. Studies on Historical and Current Patterns on Turkish Foreign Policy 
Works on Turkish foreign policy typically focus on issues such as European 
Union (EU) politics, terrorism, and NATO relations. There are very few works that deal 
with Turkey’s relationship with the Middle East and even fewer on nuclear issues in the 
Middle East.  
William Hale’s Turkish Foreign Policy 1774–2000 is one of the most significant 
studies that explore the evolution of Turkish foreign policy since the second half of the 
18th century. He focuses on the post-World War II era and argues that Turkey has an 
important place in the international system. He defines Turkey as a middle power that has 
the potential “to oblige other states to take actions which they would not otherwise have 
taken, and to resist pressure to do so from other states.”3 In other words he thinks that 
Turkey can sometimes resist powerful states’ interventions while it can have an impact 
on the weaker ones’ policies. According to Hale, four systems—balance-of-power, multi-
polarity, bipolarity, and uni-polarity—have shaped the foreign policy of the Ottoman 
Empire and its successor Turkey, since the early 19th century. In his book, he  
emphasizes the significance of Turkey’s geographical position, human and natural 
sources, and economic power as the main determinants of its position in the international 
system.4  
Turkish Foreign Policy In Post- Cold War Era, edited by Idris Bal, has several 
useful chapters about the evolution of Turkish foreign policy. Like Hale, in the foreword, 
Ersin Onulduran defines Turkey as a “medium sized regional power,” noting that the 
country is generally “affected by global political happenings.”5 In his chapter “ Turkey 
and the World in the 21st Century,” in the same book, Faruk Sonmezoglu emphasizes 
that Turkey was not able to pursue foreign policies independent from NATO and the 
3 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774‒2000 (London; Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass 
Publishers, 2002), 1. 
4 Ibid., 5‒7. 
5 Ersin Onulduran, “Foreword,” in Turkish Foreign Policy in Post-Cold War Era, ed. Idris Bal (Boca 
Raton, Florida: Brown Walker Press, 2004), vii.  
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United States until after the Cold War.6 Again in the same book, in his chapter, “Turkish 
Foreign Policy in Turbulence of the Post-Cold War Era: Impact of External and Domestic 
Constraints,” Ramazan Gozen argues that imperial collapses lead to power vacuums that 
set the stage for a new international order and that regional and global powers try to fill 
these vacuums by adapting their policies to new conditions. Gozen considers the collapse 
of the Soviet Empire as a turning point for Turkish policy.7  
Ahmet Davutoglu’s Stratejik Derinlik: Turkiyenin Uluslararasi Konumu 
(Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position) represents the most definitive work 
that summarizes both Turkey’s position historically and how the present government 
intends to approach the current international system. Davutoglu, who is currently serving 
as the Foreign Minister of Turkey, is the architect of the country’s contemporary foreign 
policy. Previously, he worked as the chief advisor to the AKP government since it came 
to power in 2002 and until he became foreign minister in 2009. Stratejik Derinlik: 
Turkiyenin Uluslararasi Konumu is comprised of three main parts. Davutoglu describes 
Turkey’s cultural and political heritage in the first part and seeks to define the power 
parameters that determine Turkey’s position in the international system. In the second 
part, he explores the country’s relationships with other territories that have historical 
connections with Turkey. In the last part of the book, Davutoglu reassesses Turkey’s 
strategic instruments and regional strategies and emphasizes the importance of multi-
dimensional policies, which essentially are based on the concept of “new Ottomanism.” 
He speaks in praise of Turgut Ozal, former prime minister and president of Turkey, and 
new Ottomanism, which seeks to reorganize the state according to the new international 
system, to establish new political and cultural identity that is harmonized with both 
Western and traditional values, to integrate with European Union and follow compatible 
policies  with the United States.8  
6 Faruk Sonmezoglu, “Turkey and the World in the 21st Century,” in Turkish Foreign Policy In Post-
Cold War Era, ed. Idris Bal (Boca Raton, Florida: Brown Walker Press, 2004), 90. 
7 Ramazan Gozen, “Turkish Foreign Policy in Turbulence of the Post-Cold War Era: Impact of 
External and Domestic Constraints,” in Turkish Foreign Policy In Post-Cold War Era, ed. Idris Bal (Boca 
Raton, Florida: Brown Walker Press, 2004), 29‒31. 
8 Ahmet Davutoglu, Stratejik Derinlik: Turkiyenin Uluslararasi Konumu [Strategic Depth: Turkey’s 
International Position] (Istanbul: Kure Yayinlari, 2001), 85. 
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Most of the international relations studies analyze the last 12 years of the Turkish 
foreign policy in terms of Davutoglu’s principles due to his significant impact on the 
AKP government. The book Turkey in the 21st Century: Quest for a New Foreign Policy 
is an example of those works. Ozden Zeynep Oktay and some other Turkish academics 
try to answer the question of whether Turkey has changed its Western-oriented policies 
into Eastern-oriented policies in the 21st century. They believe that Turkey has stopped 
following one-dimensional policies, which have been strictly dependent on the NATO 
alliance and U.S. foreign policies, and started to follow more independent and multi-
dimensional policies which necessitate rearranging its relations with the East.9 They 
attribute this conclusion to Davutoglu’s concerns about how following one-dimensional 
policies prevents Turkey from being a great power in the world.10 Considering these 
changes in foreign policy, the authors especially examine Turkey’s relations with the 
United States, EU, Russia, Israel, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Balkan countries in their chapters.  
2. Studies on Historical and Current Patterns on Brazilian Foreign 
Policy 
Works on Brazil’s foreign policy usually concentrate on U.S. relations, Latin 
American politics, and the economic potential and development of Brazil. There are very 
few works that deal with Brazil’s relationship with other parts of the world.  
Like in Turkey, 2002 was a turning point in Brazil’s foreign policy. Although 
most of the scholars think that the dramatic change started with Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso, the change in Brazil’s foreign policy actually began during Lula Da Silva’s era 
(January 1, 2003‒January 1, 2011). So, it is possible to examine Brazil’s foreign policy as 
before and after Lula da Silva’s election in 2002. 
New York Times reporter Larry Rohter is one of those writers who argue that 
Brazil has the potential to be a great power. He further states that Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso and Lula da Silva’s elections were significant milestones in the way of reaching 
9 Ozden Zeynep Oktav, et al., Turkey in the 21st Century: Quest for a New Foreign Policy 
(Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/
docDetail.action?docID=10509087. 
10 Davutoglu, Stratejik Derinlik, 71.  
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this goal. In his book Brazil on the Rise: The Story of a Country Transformed, Rohter 
claims that while in the 1960s Brazil was not seen as a serious country and had punched 
“under its weight,”11 at the end of the 20th century Brazil’s fortunes had changed. He 
states that Cardoso and Lula da Silva have been the main actors in this transformation.12 
Moreover, he argues that the United States had been the main actor in Brazil’s foreign 
policy in the 20th century and the cooperation reached its peak at the end of the century. 
After the election of Lula, Brazil began to follow independent and sometimes opposing 
policies. The reactions to the coup d’etat in Honduras in 2009 and Iran’s nuclear program 
can be considered as two significant recent events that reflect this change.13 He believes 
that “the hunger to be respected as a serious country” is the main motive for Brazil to 
maintain the transformation in the way of being a great power.14 He also states that 
Brazil has traditionally seen herself in the same league with regional powers and large 
states and feels superior to its neighbors.15 Like Rohter, in his article “Two Ways to Go 
Global,” Peter Hakim considers Cardoso’s election as the beginning of the transformation 
of Brazil into a regional and global power.16 
G. Pope Atkins is another scholar who believes that Brazil has been subject to 
dramatic changes in terms of its foreign policies in the 20th century. However, unlike 
Rohter, he argues that the transformation started earlier. He defines Brazil as the 
“sleeping giant” of Latin America and states that until the 1960s, Brazil was under the 
auspices of Britain, followed by United States-oriented policies. Starting with the 1960s, 
however, Brazil realized its potential and began to follow independent foreign policies 
which set the stage for strong relations with other parts of the world.17 
11 Larry Rohter, Brazil on the Rise: The Story of a Country Transformed (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), 223‒225. 
12 Ibid., 252. 
13 Ibid., 232. 
14 Ibid., 226. 
15 Ibid., 227. 
16 Peter Hakim, “Two Ways to Go Global,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 1 (January‒February, 2002): 153. 
17 G. Pope Atkins, Latin America and the Caribbean in the International System (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1999), 38. 
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In his recent article, “Brazil’s Rise: Seeking Influence on Global Governance,” 
Harold Trinkunas defines Brazil as a middle power that is on the way to being a major 
power. Like other scholars, he considers Lula da Silva’s election as an important event in 
Brazil’s history in the way of being an effective actor in the new international order. He 
argues that, unlike major powers, Brazil is reluctant to use hard power to reach its goal. 
Instead, it prefers to use soft power and diplomacy.18 
Giselle Datz and Joel Peters article “Brazil and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict in 
the New Century: Between Ambition, Idealism, and Pragmatism,” is one of a few works 
that focuses on Brazil’s relations with the Middle East. In this article, the authors argue 
that the increase in the economic strength of Brazil has helped the country to become a 
global player in all other areas. They believe that Lula da Silva is the architect of this 
transformation.19 They note Lula Da Silva’s efforts to develop strong relationships with 
Middle East and to have a voice over international politics of that area. Moreover, they 
argue that, in addition to the desire for being a major power, Brazil has economic and 
demographic motives to increase its relationship with the Middle East. According to 
them, the more than 12 million Arab-Brazilians is one of those motives,20 and Brazil’s 
desire to find new markets and investors is another.21  
Like most of the scholars, in their article “The U.S. in Brazil’s Foreign Policy,” 
Carlos Malamud and Carola García-Calvo claim that Brazil seeks to increase its influence 
in the international arena by following policies independent from the United States. They 
state that in the last years of the Lula da Silva administration, this desire has worsened 
Brazil-U.S. relations. According to them, “The coup d’etat in Honduras, military bases in 
Colombia, the Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s tour of Latin America and the 
climate talks in Copenhagen,” are some of the main issues that Brazil and the United 
18 Harold Trinkunas, “Brazil’s Rise: Seeking Influence on Global Governance,” Working paper 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2014), 2. 
19 Giselle Datz and Joel Peters, “Brazil and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict in the New Century: 
Between Ambition, Idealism, and Pragmatism,” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs 7, no.2 (2013): 43. 
20 Ibid., 44. 
21Datz and Peters, “Brazil and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict in the New Century,” 45. 
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States could not agree on.22 Moreover, they claim that Brazil tried to find new strong 
allies other than the United States and improved its relations with France to have a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council.23 
In her study “An Overview of Brazilian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century,” 
Monica Hirst argues that in the Lula da Silva era (2003‒2011) “Brazil has become more 
proactive in world economic, political and security affairs, and expanded its global and 
regional interests and responsibilities.” Moreover, she states that Brazil has started to 
question the fairness of world order in general and the structure of the UN in particular in 
the same period.24 
In her work, “Brazil as an Emerging Power: The View From the United States,” 
Shannon O’Neal analyzes Brazil’s rise and argues that although Brazil followed U.S.-
oriented policies during the 20th century, it was not seen as “serious country” by the 
United States. But with the election of Lula da Silva, conditions have changed and 
especially the economic potential of Brazil makes it an important regional and global 
actor in the eyes of U.S. policy makers.25  
Riordan Roett is another scholar who argues that the elections of Cardoso and 
Lula da Silva were turning points in Brazil’s history. He examines Brazil’s economic 
development in his book The New Brazil and states that although Brazil was not seen as 
an important actor in 1980s, it has surprised analysts and become one of the most 
important actors in the international system in terms of economy.26 Like Roett, Lael 
Brainard and Leonardo Martinez-Diaz explore Brazil’s changing role in the international 
22Carlos Malamud and Carola García-Calvo, “The U.S. in Brazil’s Foreign Policy,” Real Instituto 




23 Ibid., 5. 
24 Monica Hirst, “An Overview of Brazilian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century,” South African 
Institute of International Affairs, Policy Briefing 6, Emerging Powers Programme, December 2009, 2, 
http://www.saiia.org.za/policy-briefings/an-overview-of-brazilian-foreign-policy-in-the-21st-century. 
25 Shannon O’Neal, “Brazil as an Emerging Power: The View From the United States,” South African 
Institute of International Affairs, Policy Briefing 16, Emerging Powers Programme, February 2010, 2. 
26 Riordan Roett, The New Brazil (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 1. 
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economy in their book Brazil as an Economic Superpower: Understanding Brazil’s 
Changing Role in the Global Economy and seek to analyze Brazil’s success in the 
economy especially in the 21st century.27 
3. Analyses on Nuclear Deal 
There is a gap in the literature that seeks to explain the significance of the deal for 
Turkey and Brazil. Works on the nuclear deal mainly focus on the United States’ reaction 
and the failure of the deal. Most authors who have addressed the subject mainly state that 
Turkey and Brazil’s desire to be major powers and that the economic and political 
interests of both countries inspired them to engage in the deal. However, as mentioned 
earlier, the literature fails to provide detailed information about the economic aspect of 
the deal. 
Trita Parsi’s book A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran is  
one of the most important studies that seek to fill the gap in literature about the Iran 
nuclear deal. Parsi argues that Brazil and Turkey engaged in the nuclear deal because 
both countries had political and economic interests. According to Parsi, Brazil saw this 
agreement as an opportunity to prove its power in the international arena and to show its 
eligibility for permanent membership on the UN Security Council. Moreover, he claims 
that the agreement provided an important opportunity to question the unfairness of the 
existing world order and to begin reforming the international structure.28 Furthermore, 
Parsi states that Brazil engaged in the deal because it wants to use nuclear power for 
peaceful purposes and to avoid being subjected to the same policies by the UN.29 In 
addition, he asserts that Brazil considered the sanctions from a humanitarian perspective 
and tried to protect Iran from experiencing the same fate as Iraq.30 
27 Lael Brainard and Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, Brazil as an Economic Superpower: Understanding 
Brazil’s Changing Role in the Global Economy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009). 
28 Trita Parsi, A Single Role of the Dice: Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 2012), 176‒177. 
29 Ibid., 174. 
30 Ibid., 175. 
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Parsi also argues that, like Brazil, Turkey has a desire for regional and global 
leadership. This desire has two dimensions. The first shows its capability of being a great 
power, and the second controls Iran’s influence in the region as a significant regional 
leadership opponent.31Moreover, Parsi states that Turkey engaged in the deal because it 
wants to protect stability in the region and easy access to energy, which are two 
significant necessities for maintaining its growth and increasing its economic relations 
with Iran.32  
Similar to Parsi, in his article “Brezilya-Turkiye Yukselen Gucler,Yukselen 
Ortaklar,” Ariel S. Gonzalez Levaggi assesses the nuclear deal as one of the first 
significant signs of Brazil and Turkey’s desires to be great powers and to take part in big 
international issues. He also states that the deal shows the limits of Turkey and Brazil’s 
rise as global powers.33  
In his study, “United States Slams Turkey, Brazil over Iran,” Robert Dreyfuss states 
that Turkey and Brazil behaved “like adults when the United States began behaving like a 
petulant child, and they achieved a diplomatic victory.34 
Like Dreyfuss, Patrick J. Buchanan considers the deal as a success and criticizes 
the reaction of the United States. In his article “Take the Deal Mr. President,” he argues that 
Brazil and Turkey “complicated” U.S. diplomacy and says that “an Iranian bomb would 
force Turkey to consider a Turkish bomb.”  He states that Turkey wants to prevent Iran 
31 Ibid., 181. 
32 Ibid., 180. 
33 Ariel S. Gonzalez Levaggi, “Brezilya-Turkiye Yukselen Gucler,Yukselen Ortaklar,”[Brazil-Turkey 
Rising Powers, Emerging Partners] Uluslararasi Guvenlik ve Stratejik Arastirma Merkesi, 2013, 
http://www.academia.edu/4329704/Brezilya-Turkiye_Yukselen_Gucler_Yukselen_Ortaklar 
34 Robert Dreyfuss, “United States Slams Turkey, Brazil over Iran,” Washington Report on Middle 




                                                 
from producing nuclear weapons and engaging in a war with its NATO ally, the United 
States.35 
According to Harold Trinkunas, in addition to “asserting its role as a major 
power,”36 Brazil engaged in the nuclear agreement with Iran “to protect its own 
commercial interests vis-à-vis Iran as well as the general principle that states have a right 
to peaceful nuclear development.”37 Moreover, he claims that Brazil’s reluctance to use 
hard power to solve the international issues is another factor that forced Brazil to take 
part in the nuclear deal.38  
Similar to Trinkunas, Larry Rohter considers Brazil’s desire to be a major power 
one of the main reasons that forced it to engage in the nuclear deal. In his book Brazil on 
the Rise he criticizes Brazil’s incompetence and defines Brazil’s nuclear deal attempt as 
“ill-conceived or ineptly executed” policies on the “road to greatness.”39 
In her most recent study, Brazil’s Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity, 
Togzhan Kassenova seeks to fill the gap in the literature about Brazil’s ideas over nuclear 
energy and claims that “Brazilians paint a picture of an emerging power seeking nuclear 
independence and searching for its role in the global order.”40 She considers Brazil’s 
engagement in 2010 nuclear deal as an indicator of its potential “to be an active player in 
global nuclear politics.”41 
In his article “Brazil and the Nuclear Issues in the Years of the Luiz Inácio Lula 
da Silva Government (2003-2010),” Carlo Patti emphasizes the significance of nuclear 
diplomacy and argues that it has been an important instrument for Lula Da Silva to 
35 Patrick J. Buchanan, “ Take the Deal Mr. President,” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, 
Four Views, (August 2010), 28‒31; http://www.wrmea.org/wrmea-archives/357-washington-report-
archives-2006-2010/august-2010/9745-four-views-the-turkey-brazil-iran-agreement-thanks-but-no-
thanks.html. 
36 Trinkunas,“Brazil’s Rise,” 23. 
37 Ibid., 24. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Rohter, Brazil on the Rise, 226. 
40 Togzhan Kassenova, Brazil's Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity. Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014, xii. 
41 Ibid. 
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transform Brazil into a major actor in the international arena. That is why Brazil engaged 
in a nuclear deal with Iran.42 
According to Matias Spektor, the inequity of international systems is the main 
factor that forced Brazil to take part in this agreement. He claims that Brazil believes that 
the United States is not fair in its nuclear policies because “it puts pressure on an NPT 
member like Iran but rewards a nonmember like India, or…turns a blind eye to Israel’s 
nuclear capabilities.”43 
From the Turkish perspective, the comments are more detailed. Aylin Gurzel and 
Eyup Ersoy’s article “Turkey and Iran’s Nuclear Program” is one of the most important 
studies that examine the nuclear deal. In this article, the authors argue that the 
dependency on Iran in terms of energy sources, developing trade relations, the AKP 
government’s religious roots, the unintended consequences of possible military 
intervention in Iran, and Turkey’s reluctance to pick a side between the United States and 
Iran were the main motives that forced Turkey to engage in a nuclear deal with Iran.44 
Similar to Gurzel and Ersoy, Fatma Sariaslan emphasizes the negative effects of 
sanctions on Turkey and Iran’s economic relations in her study “The Economic Relations 
between Turkey and Iran in 2000s.” Moreover, Sariaslan assesses the role of Turkey in 
the nuclear deal as the consequence of new Turkish foreign policy that uses soft power as 
the main instrument to solve regional issues.45  
42 Carlo Patti, “Brazil and the Nuclear Issues in the Years of the Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 
Government (2003-2010),” Rev. Bras. Polít. Int. 53, no.2 (2010):178. 
43 Matias Spektor, “U.S. Nuclear Accommodation of Brazil a Model for Iran Policy?” World Politics 
Review, July 3, 2013, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13067/u-s-nuclear-accommodation-of-
brazil-a-model-for-iran-policy. 
44 Aylin Gurzel and Eyup Ersoy, “Turkey and Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Middle East Policy 19, no.1 
(Spring 2012): 39‒40. 
45 Fatma Sariaslan, “The Economic Relations between Turkey and Iran in 2000s,” 86‒87, 
http://www.akademikortadogu.com/belge/ortadogu14makale/fatma_sariaslan.pdf. 
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Patrick Seale emphasizes Turkey’s ability to use diplomacy in his article “The 
Consequences of Iran’s Nuclear Deal,” and states that if the deal succeeded, it could only 
consolidate “Turkey’s beneficent regional role as a mediator and peace-maker.”46 
Bayram Sinkaya and Ali Kemal Yildirim consider the matter from a different 
perspective and argue that the nuclear deal is a strong indicator of the majority of the 
world’s demands for reforming the existing international system. Furthermore, they 
believe that this deal means accepting Iran’s right to use nuclear power for peaceful 
purposes, which is an important step to eliminate the monopoly of nuclear technology.47 
In their work Global Security Watch-Turkey: A Reference Handbook, Mustafa 
and Aysegul Kibaroglu argue that although the AKP government supports the idea of 
using nuclear energy for peaceful goals, Turkey doesn’t want Iran to have the capacity of 
manufacturing nuclear weapons.48 
In 2013, Iran accepted to sign a nuclear agreement with permanent members of 
the UN Security Council and Germany. A Turkish economy professor, Hayriye Atik, 
examines the possible consequences of that deal for Turkey in her article “Iranin Batili 
Ulkelerle Imzaladigi Nukleer Anlasmanin Turkiye’ye Etkileri [The Impacts of Iran’s 
Agreement with Western States on Turkey].” Although she writes about a different deal, 
this article is useful to understand the significance of the 2010 deal for Turkey. In her 
article, Atik argues that the 2013 nuclear deal means a lot for Turkey in terms of 
economic and political consequences. She states that there will be six economic effects 
for Turkey. First, there will be a decrease in gold and oil prices, which may decrease 
Turkey’s current account deficit. Second, the success of the deal may have turned Turkey 
into an energy bridge between Iran and Europe. Third, Turkey will have the opportunity 
46 Patrick Seale, “The Consequences of Iran’s Nuclear Deal,” Washington Report on Middle East 
Affairs, Four Views, August 2010, 28-31, http://www.wrmea.org/wrmea-archives/357-washington-report-
archives-2006-2010/august-2010/9745-four-views-the-turkey-brazil-iran-agreement-thanks-but-no-
thanks.html. 
47 Bayram Sinkaya and Ali Kemal Yildirim, “Türkiye-Brezilya-İran Mutabakatı ve Uluslararası 
Sistemde Değişim Sancısı,” [Turkey-Brazil-Iran Reconciliation and Change Pains in the International 
System] Bayram Sinkaya, http://bsinkaya.blogspot.com/2011/09/turkiye-brezilya-iran-mutabakat-ve.html. 
48Mustafa Kibaroglu and Aysegul Kibaroglu, Global Security Watch-Turkey: A Reference Handbook. 
Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security, 2009, 157‒158. 
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to increase its relationship with Iran, which was adversely affected by the sanctions. 
Fourth, Turkish businessmen will have the chance to construct Iran’s infrastructure. Fifth, 
the frontier trade will revive, and sixth the foreign exchange values will decrease, which 
will consolidate the Turkish economy. On the other hand, she states that the deal may 
have both positive and negative political consequences for Turkey. Preventing Iran from 
being a nuclear power in the region may consolidate Turkey’s position. However, the 
removal of the sanctions may enhance Iran’s economic and political power, which may 
decrease Turkey’s effectiveness in the region.49 
On the other hand, the world press showed great interest in the 2010 nuclear deal. 
Almost all of the newspapers defined this attempt as unexpected and unpredictable. 
Western newspapers mostly approached the deal with skepticism and emphasized the 
necessity for approval by the United States and the other great powers. They mostly 
interpreted it as a problem for Western diplomacy. In particular, American newspapers 
like the Washington Post and The New York Times criticized Turkey and Brazil’s attempt.  
Glenn Kessler and Thomas Erdbrink, from the Washington Post considered 
Turkey and Brazil’s enterprise as an obstacle in the way of the United States’ efforts to 
reach international unity on sanctions. Moreover, they argued that Brazil and Turkey see 
“debates over Iran’s nuclear program as an important test case for their own nuclear 
ambitions.”50 
David E. Sanger and Michael Slackman expressed American policymakers’ 
skepticism about the deal and accuse Brazil and Turkey of trying to “derail a fragile 
international consensus to increase pressure on Iran,” for “their own economic 
interests.”51 
49 Hayriye Atik, “Iranin Batili Ulkelerle Imzaladigi Nukleer Anlasmanin Turkiye’ye Etkileri,” [The 
Impacts of Iran’s Agreement with Western States on Turkey] Ankara Strateji Enstitusu, 
http://www.ankarastrateji.org/yazar/prof-dr-hayriye-atik/iran-in-batili-ulkelerle-imzaladigi-nukleer-
anlasmanin-turkiye-ye-etkileri/. 
50 Glenn Kessler and Thomas Erdbrink ,“Iran and Turkey Reach Unexpected Accord on Enriched 
Uranium,” Washington Post, May 18, 2010. 
51 David E. Sanger and Michael Slackman, “U.S. Is Skeptical on Iranian Deal for Nuclear Fuel,” New 
York Times, May 18, 2010. 
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Alberto Negri, from the Italian newspaper Il Sore 24 Ole, argued that Turkey and 
Brazil were trying to be regional powers. He stated that the desire to be a permanent 
member at UN Security Council motivated Brazil to take part in the nuclear deal. On the 
other hand, he argued that the disappointments with EU relations forced Turkey to find 
other fronts to be a regional power. Moreover, he considered increasing economic 
relations and Turkey’s energy dependency on Iran as other significant factors that inspire 
Turkey to take part in the deal.52 
Like the U.S. press, Israeli newspapers approach the deal with great skepticism. 
They mostly emphasize the unreliability of Iran. Zvi Bar’el, from the Israel newspaper 
Haaretz, defines Turkey as “deals big winner,” and states that the deal not only will 
consolidate Turkey’s economy but also give Turkey some other political advantages. 
From the deal, Turkey will gain “a new status as a mediator.” Moreover, it will not have 
to pick a side between Iran and great powers, a decision that would disrupt its rise as a 
regional leader. On the other hand, he argues that Brazil expects to benefit from the deal 
especially in terms of economic relations, and that it already signed “a series of trade 
deals that are expected to increase bilateral trade between their countries to about $10 
billion.”53 
The Turkish press mostly assessed the deal as a coup of diplomacy. Taha Akyol’s 
article summarizes the Turkish point of view about the deal especially well. In his 
column in the Turkish newspaper Milliyet, he cites Ahmet Davutoglu’s comments after 
the deal and emphasizes that Turkey engaged in this deal for its economic and political 
benefits.54 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Despite all the analyses and literature about the history and evolution of Turkish 
and Brazilian Foreign Policies and the 2010 nuclear deal, there is a gap in the literature 
52 Alberto Negri, “Brazil and Turkey are Trying to Become Regional Power,” Il Sole 24 Ore, May 18, 
2010. 
53Zvi Bar’el, “Why Does Iran See Turkey as an 'Honest Broker' for a Nuclear Deal?” Haaretz, May 
18, 2010. 
54 Taha Akyol, “Diplomaside Vizyon,”[Vision in Diplomacy]Milliyet, May 19, 2010. 
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that should tie them together. This thesis will try to fill that gap by analyzing the 
significance of nuclear deal for Turkey and Brazil. Although the deal failed, it is 
important to understand the current foreign policy patterns of both states that it 
represents.  
This thesis has three hypotheses that, taken together, explain the policy of Turkey 
and Brazil. First, I hypothesize that the deal is symptomatic of current foreign policy 
trends in Ankara and Brasilia. The second hypothesis is that the deal reflects both Turkey 
and Brazil’s aspirations to be major powers in the new international order. Third, 
economic interests played an important motivating role behind the deal. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will examine the significance of the 2010 Iran nuclear deal for Turkey 
and Brazil through a historical study of the evolution of both states’ foreign policies. The 
nuclear deal shows that there is a dramatic change in the foreign policy patterns of Brazil 
and Turkey. To understand the conditions that pave the way for Turkey and Brazil to 
engage in a nuclear deal with Iran, this study will analyze the historical and current 
foreign policy patterns of Turkey and Brazil in the first and second chapters. For Turkey, 
it will mainly rely on William Hale’s book Turkish Foreign Policy 1774–2000 and 
Ahmet Davutoglu’s book Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth). For Brazil it will mainly 
use Harold Trinkunas’ recent article “Brazil’s Rise: Seeking Influence on Global 
Governance.” 
This study’s fourth and fifth chapters will address nuclear deal’s significance for 
Turkey and Brazil, respectively. Since the nuclear deal is relatively new for academic 
issues, it is hard to find compiled information. Trita Parsi’s A Single Roll of the Dice: 
Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran, Togzhan Kassenova’s book Brazil’s Nuclear 
Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity, and statistical resources will be the central sources 
for these chapters. Moreover, the study will mainly use newspapers and columnists’ 
articles to fill the literature gap in this field. In addition, to show the economic 
significance of the deal, the study will utilize governmental documents and international 
organizations’ reports. 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
After giving general information about the deal in the introduction, Chapter II will 
provide the historical and current patterns in Turkish foreign policy. It will seek to figure 
out how Ankara has traditionally approached foreign policy. How has this approach 
changed since the AKP’s election? How has it not? 
Chapter III will provide the historical and current patterns in Brazilian foreign 
policy and will try to figure out how Brasilia has traditionally approached foreign policy. 
How did this approach change since Lula Da Silva’s election? How has it not? 
Chapter IV and Chapter V will analyze the ways in which the deal reflects current 
tendencies in Turkish and Brazilian foreign policy respectively. In what ways does the 
deal reflect continuities in Turkish-Brazilian foreign policies, such as the relationship 
with the United States and support for a global consensus. Is there any other reason that 
makes the deal significant for Turkey and Brazil? The final chapter will provide the 
summary and the conclusion of the thesis. 
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Turkey has been one of the most significant states in its region and in the world as 
it reigned over a wide and strategically critical territory for many years, first as the 
Ottoman Empire (1299‒1922) and then as the Republic of Turkey (1923‒present).55 
Since the early centuries of the last millennium, it has experienced remarkable changes in 
terms of its power, boundaries, and politics. Especially after the failure of Second Siege 
of Vienna in 1683, its foreign policy transformed from one of offense to defense. Parallel 
with its shrinkage in size, Turkish foreign policy’s goals were also downsized. In the 
transition from empire to republic, Turkey experienced a change in its foreign policy 
status from the point of a major power to a nation-state.56  
However, with the election of the AKP government in 2002, Turkish foreign 
policy has signaled a return to the powerful days of Ottoman Empire. Turkey’s 
engagement in a nuclear deal with Iran in 2010 can be considered a significant milestone 
in this return. The purpose of this chapter is to present the evolution of Turkish foreign 
policy since the last days of Ottoman Empire and highlight the fundamental changes and 
new trends after 2002 with the AKP government. It will seek to determine why and how 
contemporary Turkish foreign policy under Ahmet Davutoglu and the AKP took shape. 
What interests and insecurities shape how Ankara looks at foreign policy? How does 
engagement in the nuclear deal show continuity in Turkish foreign policy? The answers 
of these questions are necessary to understand the significance of the 2010 nuclear deal 
with Iran for Turkey. 
This chapter argues that there have been many determinants in the evolution of 
the foreign policy of Turkey since the establishment of the republic. The Ottoman Empire 
legacy, Turkey’s geography, Westernization, political pro-status quo, external 
55 Sedat Laciner, A Complete Bibliography of Turkey and Turks in English: Turkey and the World, 
Vol. 1 (Istanbul: Kaknus Yayinlari, 2001), 17. 
56 George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 4th ed, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University, 1980), 121. 
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developments, and the Russian threat have been most significant ones. Turkish foreign 
policy can be examined in terms of its continuities in three main periods: from the 
beginning of the decline of the Ottoman Empire to the beginning of Cold War (1774‒
1946), during the Cold War (1946‒1991), and after the end of the Cold War (1991‒
today). The first period can be divided into two parts: the last period of the Ottoman 
Empire (1774‒1923) and the first period of the Republic of Turkey (1923‒1946). During 
the last period of the Ottoman Empire, Turkish policy makers followed balance of power 
policies to prevent the collapse of the empire. The Ottoman Empire became a part of the 
European concert but it was not considered an equal member. Western imperialism 
hindered Ottoman territorial, political, and economic sovereignty. Ottoman nationalists at 
the end desired a fully independent state that was free of Western control and able to 
operate in international affairs independent of foreign influence. During the first period of 
Republic of Turkey, policy makers adopted a political pro-status quo, nationalist, and 
neutralist foreign policy principles.57 The second main period of the evolution of Turkish 
foreign policy was mainly shaped by Cold War conditions. Considering its inability to act 
on its own, similar to most of the other states, Turkey had followed U.S.-oriented 
policies. In the current main period, Turkey has signaled a return to the peak of the 
Ottoman Empire in terms of its foreign policy. From 1991 on, it emerged as a global 
power, and since the election of the AKP government in 2002, it has begun to follow 
autonomous policies.58 This chapter seeks to analyze the evolution of Turkish foreign 
policy in three main periods to show the differences in Turkish foreign policy in the 21st 
century that set the stage for Turkey’s engagement in the Iran-Turkey-Brazil nuclear deal 
in 2010. 
57 Simon V. Vayall, Turkey: Thwarted Ambition (Washington, DC: McNair, 1997), 39‒40. 
58 Ramazan Erdag and Tuncay Kardas, “Turk Dis Politikasi Ve Stratejik Kultur,”[Turkish Foreign 
Policy and Strategic Culture] Turk Dis Politikasi Yilligi, 2012, 79, http://www.kardas.sakarya.edu.tr/sites/
kardas.sakarya.edu.tr/file/1387670250-TuncayRamazan.pdf.pdf. 
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B. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE THE COLD WAR  
1. The Ottoman Era (1774‒1923) 
The Ottoman Empire was at the peak of its power in the 16th and 17th centuries 
in the fields of military, technology, economy, and administration. However, by the early 
18th century, it lagged behind all of its major contemporaries in all these respects and its 
future became a challenge for both its governors and the great powers of the time.59 From 
that time to the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the relationships between the Ottoman 
Empire and the great powers had been mainly shaped by the “Eastern Question,” (Şark 
Meselesi).60 The definition of the “Eastern Question,” was first used as a political term in 
the 1815 Congress of Vienna to define the attempts of the European States to weaken the 
Ottoman Empire and seize portions of its territories.61 
From the early 18th century on, the balance of power remarkably changed in 
favor of the West.62 These developments relegated Ottoman Empire in to an inferior 
position in the world order. It became highly dependent on great powers to maintain its 
integrity.63 From that time to the end of the Cold War in 1991, there was a balance of 
power in the world. Morgenthau defines this system as “an actual state of affairs in which 
power is distributed among several nations with approximate equality.”64 Since the 
Ottoman Empire was no longer able to protect its integrity on its own, Ottoman policy-
makers had begun to follow balance of power policies to meet the requirements of the 
balance of power politics. During the 18th and 19th centuries, to deal with the problem of 
survival in the Balkans, the Straits, Egypt, and the Middle East, the Ottoman Empire 
attempted to exploit the balance of power among the great powers of the time. In that 
59 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774‒2000, 13‒14. 
60 A. L. Macfie, The Eastern Question, 1774‒1923 (London and New York: Longman, 1996), 1. 
61 Rifat Ucarol, Siyasi Tarih: 1789‒2001, [Political History: 1774‒1923] 7th ed. (Istanbul: Der 
Yayinlari, 2008), 49. 
62 Ibid., 48‒50. 
63 Mustafa Aydin, “Security Conceptualization in Turkey,” In Security and Environment in the 
Mediterranean: Conceptualizing Security and Environmental Conflicts, 345‒357. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 
2003. 
64 Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power History and Theory (New York: Routledge, 1996), 4. 
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period, Russia started to follow expansionist policies over Ottoman Empire. Benefiting 
from the weakening of the Ottoman Empire, Russia adopted the policies of seizing the 
northern Black Sea and controlling the Caucasus, Straits, and Balkans to fulfill its main 
goals in foreign relation. It used its religious identity as an instrument to realize these 
ambitions. Due to these policies, both states engaged in various wars against each other. 
The Russo-Ottoman War of 1768‒1774 that ended with the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca 
marked the opening of new period in which foreign powers began to intervene in the 
internal and external affairs of the Ottoman Empire.65 Russia’s increasing influence over 
Ottoman territories disturbed other great powers of the time that tried to solve the 
“Eastern Question” in favor of their interests. So, Russia’s imperial policies and ethnic 
fragmentation brought the empire closer to Britain and France to modernize its military 
and administration.66 Imperial administrators at the time attempted to put into practice a 
generalized policy of reform in the nineteenth century. According to this policy, the 
Ottoman Empire first tried to westernize the state and become part of Europe; second, it 
created a legal regime of equality between Muslims and Christians in order to prevent the 
appearance of nationalist movements among non-Muslim groups.67 Westernization first 
emerged as a formal policy that started with bureaucratic reforms.68 In time, it spread to 
other areas, including the military and economy. Policy makers began to see it as the only 
solution to the existing problems. As a result of this perception, until the second half of 
the 19th century, Great Britain had been the main ally of the Ottoman Empire while 
Russia had been the permanent enemy. From 1870s to the end of the World War I, when 
Germany emerged as a global power, Ottoman policy makers picked Germany as an ally. 
All these attempts helped the empire delay its collapse.69 
65 Ucarol, Siyasi Tarih: 1789‒2001, 65‒66. 
66 Hasan Kosebalan, Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 25. 
67 Behlul Ozkan, “The Collapse of Davutoglu's Pan-Islamist Foreign Policy,” Hurriyet Daily News, 
November 5, 2014. 
68M.Sukru Hanioglu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, 4th ed. (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2010), 62‒64. 
69 Cengiz Okman, “Turkish Foreign Policy: Principles-Rules-Trends, 1814-2003,” in Turkish Foreign 
Policy in Post-Cold War Era, ed. Idris Bal (Boca Raton, Florida: Brown Walker Press, 2004), 5‒10. 
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The Ottoman Empire’s 622 years of permanent rule formed a legacy which had 
both positive and negative impacts on Turkish foreign policy. Although Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk attempted to completely reject the Ottoman legacy through abolishing monarchy 
and founding a secular republic, the Ottoman legacy has continued to be one of the main 
determinants of Turkish foreign policy.70 On the one hand, this legacy has provided 
Turkey a significant potential to influence a wide geography; on the other hand, it had 
negative impacts on Turkey’s relations with all its neighbors, which harmed Turkish 
foreign policy.71All of the Turkey’s current neighboring countries, except for Iran, were 
under the auspices of the Ottoman Empire in different times, which has had a great 
impact on Turkey’s relations with them.72 In the early 19th century, for instance, ethnic 
nationalism began to pose a serious challenge to the empire’s territorial integrity. Greeks 
and Serbs were the pioneer groups of rebellions. Romanians, Bulgarian and Macedonian 
Slavs, and Armenians followed them. On the one hand, these Christian minorities 
accused the Turks of being responsible for killing Greeks on the islands of Chios in 1822, 
committing atrocities in the Bulgarian Horror by suppressing the Bulgarian rebellion of 
1876, and slaughtering and deporting the majority of the Anatolian Armenians in 1915. 
On the other hand, Turks accused these Christian minorities of killing approximately 5 
million Muslims in the Balkans, Greece, the Caucasus, and the Crimea and expelling 
around 5.4 million of them from their lands as a result of Russian imperialism and Balkan 
and Greek nationalism.73 Moreover, Syria, Bulgaria, Iraq, and Greece struggled against 
the empire to get their independence, which made Turks an eternal enemy in the eyes of 
their policy-makers and societies.74 Most of them have designed since their history 
70 Feroz, The Making of Modern Turkey, 15. 
71 Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy,” 164. 
72 Mesut Ozcan, Harmonizing Foreign Policy: Turkey, the EU and the Middle East (Burlington, 
Vermont: Ashgate, 2008), 81.  
73 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774‒2000, 16. 
74 İdris Bal,Değişen Dünyada Uluslararası İlişkiler [International Relations in Changing World] 
(Istanbul: Lalezar kitabevi, 2006), 652. 
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education systems on the basis of anti-Ottoman-Turkish trend. For instance, Georgia,75 
Armenia,76 Syria,77 Greece,78 and Bulgaria79 all depict Turks as a brutal people and 
accuse Turkey of being the source of most of their historical problems in their history 
books.80 These perceptions isolated Turkey from its region and set the stage for passive 
and defensive policies until the end of the 20th century.  
2. The First Period of the Republic of Turkey (1923‒1946) 
“Peace in the country, peace in the world.”81 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s famous 
saying reflects the essence of Turkish foreign policy during the 20th century. The Turkish 
Republic was established in 1923 on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire and Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk and his friends attempted to found a new nation on the basis of completely 
different principles from the empire.82 Turkey experienced a fundamental transformation 
and became a small nation-state devoted to the existing status quo and which was no 
longer following expansionist policies.83 Despite the rise of contemporary totalitarian 
regimes such as the Nazis and the Soviet Union, which refused Western values, Turkey 
attempted to be part of West and adopted westernization as “an ideal worth struggling 
75 Arif Akpinar, “Gurcu Ders Kitaplarinda Turk Dusmanligi,” [ Turkish Hostility in Georgian 
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for.”84 During this period, it adopted pro-status quo, nationalist, and neutralist foreign 
policy principles at the expense of the territorial ambitions that Ataturk originally 
harbored for his newly established country. From that time to the end of the 20th century, 
maintenance of the status quo had been one of the main principles of Turkish foreign 
policy.85 In the aftermath of the First World War and due to Turkey’s “weak, exhausted, 
under-resourced, and distrusted,”86 condition, Ataturk tried to protect the state through 
four main principles: “declared renunciation of aggressive, expansionist intent; the 
strongest possible defense of territorial integrity; international acceptance, particularly by 
the West; and regional security arrangements.”87 
In this era, Turkey continued to preserve its existence thorough peaceful attempts. 
To prepare suitable conditions for quick transformation at home, Turkey sought to solve 
external problems through diplomacy.88 The power vacuum in the continent that was 
formed by the decline of Great Britain and the European States’ discontent of seeing the 
re-emergence of a new Turkish state as a power in the region set the stage for alignment 
with the USSR, which was very brief, in the first half of 1920s. During that era, both 
Turkey and the USSR were excluded from the international system and were suffering 
from problems of fundamental transformation. They signed the Treaty of Friendship and 
Neutrality in 1925. On the other hand, in 1926, Turkey reached an agreement with Britain 
over the Mosul and Kirkuk oil fields. Moreover, to improve relations with Greece, 
Turkey signed a Greek-Turco treaty in 1930 that would maintain Turkey-Greek relations 
“correct, if not warm, until 1960s.”89 In addition, to achieve the goal of international 
acceptance within a legal frame-work and to put an end to isolation, Turkey entered the 
League of Nations in 1932. It also settled a Balkan Pact in 1934 to provide regional 
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stability, and the Saadabad Pact in 1937 to arrange relations with allied states in the 
East.90 
When Ataturk was on deathbed in 1938, he said to his followers that “A world 
war is near. In the course of this war international equilibrium will be entirely destroyed. 
If during this period, we act unwisely, and make the smallest mistake, we will be faced 
with an even graver catastrophe than in the Armistice years.”91 Considering Ataturk’s 
warnings, Turkey continued to follow passive and neutral foreign policies after the death 
of Ataturk. In 1939, it signed a non-aggression agreement with France that gave the 
Republic of Hatay to Turkey. This attempt brought Turkey closer to Allied powers, 
because the Hatay issue was the last remaining grievance of Turkey against the West and 
it was eliminated through this pact. In the same period, the USSR and Nazi Germany 
concluded a non-aggression pact, known as Molotov-Ribbentrop pact that strained the 
relations between Turkey and the USSR. The world was again at the brink of a world 
war. Despite Turkey’s peaceful efforts to protect the status quo, such as sending its 
foreign minister Sukru Saracoglu to Moscow, the USSR’s unfriendly intentions over 
Turkey’s territory and resentment against Turkey’s increasing relations with the West left 
Turkey’s efforts fruitless. During the Second World War, Turkish foreign policy was 
based on the principle of protecting its boundaries from occupation by totalitarian 
powers. Turkey was afraid of offending both sides, so it tried to follow an “active 
neutrality policy” during the war.92 G. L. Clutton, Official of Foreign Office during the 
Second World War, defines Turkey’s active neutrality as: 
An active neutral has a foot in both camps. It is permissible for him to 
have an alliance with one of the belligerents so long as he has a pact of 
friendship with the other. This policy enables the country to preserve its 
neutrality, but at the same time gives an opportunity for cashing in on the 
side of whichever belligerent wins the war. It also enables the neutral 
power to preserve its preference for one belligerent or the other. There is 
something Ghandiesque and positively immoral in this policy, but it is, I 
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fear, typically Turkish and its astuteness and cleverness cannot be 
denied.93  
As a requirement for this policy during the Second World War, Turkey’s only 
move was closing the Straits in 1939 to foreign warships in line with the Montreux 
Convention. However, the entrance of the United States into the war and successful 
Allied diplomacy convinced Turkey to enter the war in February 1945 in a symbolic 
manner. Actually, Turkey attended the war to take part in the United Nations Conference 
at San Francisco.94 
C. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR (1946‒1991) 
The Second World War ended up with the defeat of Axis powers which set the 
stage for a new struggle between the world’s two global powers: the United States and 
the Soviet Union. While the former was supporting the values of democracy and 
capitalism, the latter had a Marxist-Leninist ideology, which claimed to dispense justice 
all over the world. In a very short period of time, international order turned into a bipolar 
system and both states’ rivalry jumped in to various territories including Turkey. Until 
the 1920s, the Ottoman Empire’s territorial integrity was under threat from Russia and 
this threat was eliminated temporarily by signing of Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality 
in 1925.95 However, the transformation of the international system after the Second 
World War caused “the rise of old eastern question from its grave,” for Turkey.96 With 
the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union had again begun to follow 
expansionist policies. It abolished the Treaty of Friendship in 194597 and started to 
demand military bases in the Bosphorus and Dardenelles Straits and some territories from 
Turkey.98 As it was not capable of defending itself on its own, and it had no other choice 
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(such as remaining neutral), the re-emergence of Russian threat forced Turkey to give up 
balance of power policies and take part in the Western camp.99 Being the Soviet Union’s 
neighbor and controlling the straits that were only ways for Soviet Union to reach the 
Mediterranean Sea made Turkey a significant ally for the United States to prevent the 
expansion of the Soviet Union.100 Since there was no other power in the region to oppose 
the Soviet’s progress, the United States attempted to strengthen Turkey and Greece in 
economic and military fields thorough the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and the Marshall 
Plan between 1948 and 1951. These developments brought Turkey closer to the West.101 
This change was more visible in Turkey’s position in Arab-Israel relations. While Turkey 
supported the idea of establishing an independent Arab state in the region, after it 
received aid from the United States, it officially recognized Israel as a state in 1949.102 
Turkey’s shift in this policy set the stage for deterioration in its relations with Arab states 
in the region.103 In addition to domestic developments, such as an economic downturn 
and the extensive discontent of society about the one-party regime, the need to convince 
the West about the power of democracy in Turkey urged the country to make the 
transition to a multi-party system in 1946. The Democrat Party was established by former 
members of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar and 
seized the power in 1950 after a democratic election. Similar to previous rulers, they 
preferred to act together with the West and they adopted American-oriented foreign and 
economic policies.104 The Democrat Party’s foreign policy principles were declared in 
official government programs, which obviously prioritized the relations with the United 
States and West.105 During the first days of the DP government, the Korean War erupted, 
99 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000, 109‒110. 
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and to attend NATO meetings and to strengthen Turkey’s position in the West, the 
Menderes government agreed to send Turkish troops to Korea to fight against socialist 
North Korea.106 In 1952, Turkey attended NATO as an important element, but one that 
was subservient to U.S. policy interests. From that time on, Turkey’s alliance with the 
United States continued until the 1990s without any serious problems except for the 
Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson’s letter107 regarding the 
Cyprus issue in 1964, and opium disagreement and the Cyprus invasion in 1970s.108 
Turkey signed an agreement with the United States to deploy mid-range Jupiter missiles 
in Izmir against the Soviet Union and make them operational in 1962.109 Fearing the 
Soviet response, the United States asked Turkey to cancel the deployment of these 
missiles in 1961 and 1962, but Turkey refused this demand due to security concerns.110 
In response, the USSR placed nuclear missiles in Cuba and the world came to the brink 
of a nuclear war in 1962.111 In 1964, when the Rum side of Cyprus increased its pressure 
over Turkish Cypriots, Turkish government decided to conduct a military operation to the 
island that contradicted U.S. regional interests. President Lyndon B. Johnson wrote a 
letter, known as Johnson’s letter, to Ismet Inonu in which he harshly warned Turkey not 
to act on its own. This letter discouraged Turkey from intervening militarily in Cyprus.112 
During the 1960s, Turkey was one of the main producers of opium and Western states 
began to accuse it of illegal opium traffic.113 In that period, the United States wanted 
Turkey to destroy its opium fields but Turkey refused to do this until 1971 because opium 
production was necessary for many Turkish citizens to earn their keep.114 However, the 
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United States succeeded in convincing Turkey after a regime change in 1971.115 In 1974, 
Cyprus experienced a military coup which threatened the existence of Turkish Cypriots. 
In response, Turkey, on its own, invaded the island on July, 20, 1974, to protect them.116 
Due to this intervention, the United States imposed sanctions on Turkey from 1974 to 
1978.117 Although the Soviet threat relatively decreased after Stalin’s death in 1953, 
Turkey continued to follow U.S.-oriented policies.118 The DP government was 
overthrown with a military coup in 1960 that opened the era of military coups. From 
1960s to the end of the Cold War, Turkey experienced three military interventions in its 
government on May 27, 1960, on March 12, 1971, and on September 12, 1980. Although 
these military coups were considered the main reason for democratic retrogression, they 
did not have a great impact in the direction of foreign policy for the leaders of all three 
military coups identified themselves with the Western world through their statements. For 
instance, after the 1960 coup, the National Unity Committee emphasized the importance 
of relations with the United States and Turkey’s membership in NATO and CENTO in its 
announcement.119 Moreover, although the United States failed to convince the Justice 
Party (AP), which led the government between 1965 and 1971, not to increase its 
economic relations with the Soviet Union and to destroy Turkey’s opium production, the 
United States reached its goal through the new government established after the March 
12 memorandum in 1971.120 Similar to 1960, on September 12, the leader of the coup 
Kenan Evren declared that Turkey was going to be faithful in all previous agreements, 
including NATO.121 Although, in general, military governments maintained good 
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relations with the United States, Turkey had been politically and economically isolated 
from both East and West in their era.122 
D. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR (1991‒TODAY) 
The post-Cold War period can be divided into two parts: 1991‒2002 and 2002‒
today.  
1. Turkish Foreign Policy from 1991 to 2002 
Turkey saw the end of the Cold War under the presidency of Tugut Ozal, who had 
a significant place in Turkish politics, first as prime minister from 1983 to 1989, then as 
president from 1989 to 1993.123 Under his leadership, Turkish foreign policy experienced 
a fundamental transformation in terms of its goals.124 Similar to previous governments of 
Turkey, he prioritized relations with the West. Turkey applied to be a member of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) during his era.125 However, unlike previous 
leaders, he believed that Turkey should more like the Ottoman Empire and he increased 
foreign policy goals to the global level. He tried to give up the status quo perception126 
and attempted to expand Turkey’s influence from the “Adriatic to the Great Chinese 
Wall,” particularly through economic enterprises.127 To reach these goals, he sought to 
reconcile eastern and western cultures and to use Turkey’s relations with the United 
States, the Islamic World, and Central Asia as a tool.128 For instance, he had good 
relations with the United States due to his free-market economy perspective and 
assistance on U.S. policies in the Middle East, Caucasia, and Central Asia. Benefiting 
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from the United States’ Iraq policies, he envisaged how to get the former Ottoman 
territories of Mosul and Kirkuk back.129 To take part in the new order more effectively 
and to show the change in its foreign policy perspective under Ozal’s leadership, Turkey 
attempted to increase its relations with Turkic states in Central Asia and to engage in 
Bosnia and Serbia-Montenegro issues. It opened 12 new embassies in Turkic states and 
other countries and granted many scholarships to the students from these states. 
Moreover, Turkey promised financial assistance to these states and Bosnia and supported 
them in the international arena. All these attempts helped Turkey to diversify its 
international relations and gain its self-confidence back in the international arena.130 
However, Ozal’s unprecedented death in 1993 caused a delay in realizing Turkey’s 
ambitions of being global player.131 After Ozal’s death, Turkey’s effort to be a part of the 
West through the European Union continued. However, due to some domestic problems, 
such as weak coalitions, Turkey’s progress was limited with its entrance to the custom 
union in 1996.132 
2. The AKP Era (2002‒today) 
The election of the AKP government has been a turning point in Turkish foreign 
policy. During that era, Turkey has eliminated most of the limitations on its foreign 
policy that forced it to be passive and reactive in its relations with the world. The 
growing awareness and pride in its Ottoman past and the increasing economic/political 
significance of Turkey played an important role in this transformation. Ahmet Davutoglu, 
former foreign minister and current prime minister of Turkey, has been the architect of 
this change. Under his guidance, Turkey has revised its foreign policy goals and aimed at 
regional and global leadership. It has attempted to establish a Pax Ottomana133 on the 
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legacy of Ottoman Empire.134 It has mostly eliminated the negative aspects of historical 
legacies, such as deep-rooted enmities with its neighbors that isolated it from the world 
and forced it to be passive and reactive in its foreign policy. It has begun to use the 
significant potential of Ottoman influence over a wide geographic area. Moreover, 
Turkey has turned the problematic nature of its region and geography into an opportunity 
by playing key roles in solving problems. On the other hand, while Turkey had adopted 
passive, reaction-based foreign policies until the late 20th century, it left pro-status quo 
policies and has started to follow more independent and active ones in the 21st 
century.135 Furthermore, Turkey has started to take advantage of developments in the 
international order and diversified its relations with other parts of the world.  
After the election of the AKP government, the Ottoman legacy has no longer been 
a problem for Turkey. Instead, Turkey has started to take advantage of it. Ahmet 
Davutoglu’s “Policy of Zero Problems,” which is an active interpretation of Ataturk’s 
“Peace at home peace in the world,” perception, played the key role in this change. This 
policy is based on the principles of “security for all,” “political dialogue,” “economic 
interdependence,” “cultural harmony,” and “mutual respect.”136 Turkey tries to achieve 
these goals through High Level Cooperation Councils, visa exemptions and free trade 
agreements.137As of June 2014, Turkey has canceled visas with 72 countries.138 It has 
attempted to prepare a suitable environment for its development in social, political, and 
economic fields by solving its problems with neighboring countries through this new 
vision.139 In addition to these efforts, Turkey has sought to solve historical enmity 
problems with its neighbors that date back to Ottoman Empire era and isolate it from the 
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world. In 2008, for instance, Turkey and some countries in its region have begun to revise 
history books that used to have unfriendly statements about each other. The attempt to 
rewrite 400 years of shared history of the Ottoman Empire has been led by the Research 
Center for Islamic History, Art and Culture (IRCICA), an Istanbul-based organization. 
The first application has started with Syria and will continue with 21 other Arab 
countries.140 Similar to these attempts, as a requirement of this “policy of zero 
problems,” Turkey tried to normalize its relations with Armenia. Due to the experiences 
of First World War, both states accused each other of carrying out genocide and did not 
accept to come to the table to improve their relations. However, in the AKP era, both 
countries’ presidents visited each other and watched their national teams’ soccer games in 
the stadium together.141 Considering the level of previous relations, these events can be 
seen as quantum leaps. 
As a requirement for “Problems of Zero Policy,” Turkey has increased its 
relations with Russia and put an end to seeing Russia as a permanent threat. Peace and 
cooperation periods had been very short during 500 years of historical relations between 
Turkey and Russia.142 Until the end of the Cold War in 1991, Russia had been a serious 
problem for Turkey, due its expansionist policies that posed a threat to Turkey’s 
territorial integrity. Especially during the Cold War, this threat perception had played a 
significant role in the formation of Turkish foreign policy and brought Turkey closer to 
the West. This rapprochement compelled Turkey to be highly dependent on the West in 
its foreign relations. With the end of the Cold War the relations between Russia and 
Turkey have started to increase and after the election of the AKP in 2002, they reached a 
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peak, particularly in the economic field. As of 2013, Russia has become Turkey’s top 
trading partner in imports.143   
Turkey is located among four main problematic regions of the world: Balkans, 
Caucasus, Middle East, and Persian Gulf. Moreover, due to its bridge position, it was 
stuck between East and West and it experienced an identity problem. However, since the 
election of the AKP government Turkey has turned its geography and identity into 
opportunity by being active in the field of mediation. It has been the eyes and ears of the 
great powers, particularly the United States, in the region, which has strengthened its 
strategic-ally position. Turkey has carried out effective mediation initiatives and played 
important roles in many peace agreements such as those in Iraq, Lebanon, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Iran.144 
Until the 21st century, Turkish foreign policy was based on the status quo, which 
made Turkey passive and reactionary in its foreign relations. During the 20th century, 
Turkey was not very interested in international issues unless they posed direct threat to its 
position. However, in the 21st century, Turkish policy-makers have begun to follow 
multi-dimensional and pre-emptive policies which mean that “Turkey steers 
developments by taking initiatives rather than merely watching them unfold and 
determine a stance accordingly.”145  
Since the early 18th century, Turkey was highly dependent on great powers of the 
time and it had to follow a balance of power policy to maintain its existence. It was not 
completely autonomous in its foreign relations. Especially, since the second half of the 
20th century, it followed U.S.-oriented foreign policies. However, with the new foreign 
policy vision of Davutoglu, it has begun to make decisions that serve its interests 
regardless of the reactions of great powers. Its opposition to the usage of its territories 
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during the Second Iraq War by the United States, known as the March One Permit,146 
and disallowance of the U.S. Navy’s entrance to the Black Sea during the Russia-Georgia 
war in 2008 were two main examples of this new policy.147 After the election of the AKP 
government, Turkey has revised its Westernization perspective. In this era, while it has 
continued to attempt to reach the democracy standards of the West through policies of 
compliance with the laws of the European Union, its foreign relations have no longer 
been limited with West. It has discovered other parts of the world and increased its 
relations with them in all fields, particularly the economic field. According to 2013 data, 
for instance, Russia and China ranked as the top two trading partners of Turkey.148 
E. CONCLUSION 
In summary, Turkish foreign policy can be examined in three different periods in 
terms of its continuities: the period between the beginning of decline of the Ottoman 
Empire and the beginning of the Cold War (1774‒1946), during the Cold War (1946‒
1991), and after the end of the Cold War (1991‒today). The first period can be divided 
into two eras: the last centuries of the Ottoman Empire (1774‒1923) and the first years of 
the Republic of Turkey (1923‒1946). During the last centuries of the empire, Ottoman 
foreign policy makers followed balance of power policies to protect the integrity of 
empire. In the first years of the Republic of Turkey, Turkish foreign policy was passive 
and reactionary. It aimed to preserve the status quo, because Turkish foreign policy-
makers of the time considered this as the only way to protect the formation and 
independence of a new state. In this era, due to a lack of power, Turkey also had to 
follow the balance of power policies. During the Cold War era, Turkish foreign policy 
became highly dependent on the United States and Western states. With the end of the 
Cold War in 1991, Turkish foreign policy entered a new era. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union provided new opportunities for Turkey. Turkish foreign policy makers, under the 
146 “Gul'den 1 Mart Tezkeresi Itirafi” [Marc 1 Permission Confession from Gul] CNN Turk, 
November 11, 2010. 
147 Ergin Saygun, “Amerikan Gemisini Karadenize Sokmadik,” [We Didn’t Let the U.S. Ship Enter 
the Black Sea] Aydinlik, September 27, 2012. 
148 “List of Supplying Markets for the Product Imported by Turkey in 2013,” Trade Map. 
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leadership of Turgut Ozal, started to question former policies that were based on the 
status quo. However, Turkey failed to use this opportunity to take a significant part in the 
new world order that was created by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Weak coalition 
governments and other domestic problems played a significant role in this failure. With 
the election of the AKP in 2002, Turkish foreign policy has entered a new era in which 
Turkey attempts to be a regional and global player. In this era, Turkey has eliminated 
most of the limitations that forced it to be passive and reactionary. It put into effect the 
“Problems of Zero Policy,” and increased its relations with neighboring countries, 
including Armenia, Russia, and Syria, all of which had a permanent hostility against 
Turkey due to the Ottoman legacy. In addition, while in the past Russia was considered a 
serious threat that had been a significant determinant in the formation of Turkish foreign 
policy during the 20th century, with the new vision in foreign policy Russia has become 
an important economic partner. Moreover, Turkey has started to take advantage of its 
geographic position by engaging in regional issues as a strategic partner of great powers, 
particularly the United States. In addition, it has stopped having Western-oriented foreign 
policies and diversified its international partners. Furthermore, it gave up status quo-
based foreign policies and has started to follow active ones that best serve its interests. In 
addition, while Turkey was highly dependent on great powers in its foreign relations and 
it had to follow the balance of power policies to maintain its existence, in the 21st century 
it has started to follow autonomous policies regardless of the reactions of great powers. 
Again in this period, Turkey has diversified its foreign relations, which were limited to 
the West during the 20th century, and increased its relations with other parts of the world, 
such as China, through economic enterprises. 
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III. BRAZIL’S FOREIGN POLICY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As the world’s seventh-largest economy, the fourth-largest democracy by over 
200 million people, and “a country of continental size,” the position of Brazil in the 
international order has been a controversial topic in the field of international relations and 
history in the last 150 years.149 It has made quantum leaps in both the domestic and 
foreign arenas in the 21st century, such as its remarkable economic development, its 
participation in the G-20 group of Economy and Finance Ministers, signing of the nuclear 
deal with Iran, and hosting the 2014 World Cup in soccer and the 2016 Summer 
Olympics. These all put Brazil in the international spotlight and spurred the debates over 
its international status again. Although there have been various types of comments about 
its position in the international system, most of the scholars agree on one point: Brazil 
constantly “punches under its weight.”150 A detailed explanation of the reasons for the 
huge difference between Brazil’s potential and its international status is beyond the scope 
of this study. 
Instead, to understand Brazil’s role in 2010 nuclear deal with Iran, this chapter 
examines why and how contemporary Brazilian foreign policy has taken shape over time 
and what interests and insecurity have influenced how Brasilia looks at foreign policy. It 
divides the history of Brazil’s foreign policy into three main phases—before, during, and 
after the Cold War—and seeks to show how Brazil has adjusted itself to new conditions 
to develop economically, while also maintaining its adherence to historical legacies of its 
respect of world peace, sovereignty, disarmament, non-intervention and the resolution of 
disputes through diplomacy. 
Since the early 19th century, Brazil has followed pacifist, legalist, and pragmatic 
foreign policies.151 From that time on, economic interests have been the main 
149 Alfred P. Montero, Brazil: Reversal of Fortune (Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2014), 1‒2. 
150 Rohter, Brazil on the Rise: The Story of a Country Transformed, 225. 
151 Carlos Vidigal, “Brazil: A Cordial Power? Brazilian Diplomacy in the Early 21st Century,” 
RECIIS 4, no. 1 (March 2010): 35. 
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determinant in its foreign relations irrespective of regime types. In other words, 
regardless of whether they have been monarchists or republicans, democrat or dictator, 
nationalists or liberals, all of the decision makers attempted to use foreign policy as an 
instrument to assist the national development of country. The disagreements have only 
emerged about the models of development. Throughout this period, policy makers have 
been mainly divided into two groups in terms of their development perception. One group 
has advocated a dependent development model which requires international support, 
while the other has been in favor of an independent development model based on national 
sources.152 Since its independence, Brazil has not been a self-sufficient state and has not 
possessed adequate economic and military capabilities to shape international order on its 
own.153 Moreover, it has not been eager to assume the costs of being a rule maker.154 
Considering all these facts, Brazilian decision makers have preferred to adjust their 
foreign policies to new conditions in ways that serve Brazil’s best economic interests.155 
Brazil’s changing tactics to increase its status in the international system in the last 
century was comprised of its attempts to benefit from emerging opportunities which were 
created by great powers competitions.156 Given that Western states have been hegemons 
in the last 150 years, Brazil has mainly followed Western-oriented, particularly U.S.-
oriented, foreign policies. Although, it has been mostly believed that Brazil has had a 
strong desire to be included among these great powers, its historical track in foreign 
relations and most of its governors’ understanding of rise, which was only economic, 
proved that Brazil did not attach that much importance to “take up a place at the top 
table,” unless it was necessary for the country’s economic development.157 Were Brazil 
152 Amado Luiz Cervo, “Political Regimes and Brazil’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy and Political 
Regime, ed. by Jose Flavio Sombra Saraiva (Brasilia: Instituto Brasiliro de Relacoes Internacionais, 2003), 
353‒54. 
153 Montero, Brazil: Reversal of Fortune, 152. 
154 Trinkunas,“Brazil’s Rise: Seeking Influence on Global Governance,” 22. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid., 10‒11. 
157 Mark S. Langevin, “A Brazil Works Review of Harold Trinkunas’ ‘Brazil’s Rise: Seeking 
Influence on Global Governance’,” Brazil Works Analysis and Advisory, August 29, 2014, http://brazil-
works.com/?tag=harold-trinkunas. 
 40 
                                                 
to have the economic capabilities of Canada, for instance, we would not speak about its 
efforts to become a major power.  
Brazil’s historical legacy of sovereignty, disarmament, non-intervention, and the 
resolution of disputes through diplomacy, has been the chief factor in determining its 
approaches to international issues since its independence.158 Amado Luiz Cervo extends 
this list slightly and defines the foundations that have shaped historical Brazilian foreign 
policy as: “a) self-determination, non-intervention and peaceful solution of controversies; 
b) legalism; c) normative multilateralism; d) cooperative and non-confrontational 
external action; e) strategic partnerships; f) realism and pragmatism; g) official cordiality 
in the treatment of neighbors; h) development as a direction; i) independence of 
international insertion.”159 These “universalistic, cooperative, and pacifistic,” 
characteristics of Brazilian diplomacy have been constant irrespective of regime and 
government types with some small exceptions, such as frictions with Argentina regarding 
Peron’s interventionist policies in the late 1940s and the River Plate Basin disagreement 
in the late 1970s.160 
Brazil has historically used diplomacy for three main functions: “securing 
territorial sovereignty, delimiting boundaries, and development.”161 After ensuring its 
regional security and solving border problems in the early years of the 20th century, 
Brazil started to use diplomacy as a means for development. The 1930 revolution was a 
breaking point in this transition. The revolution also marked the beginning of the idea of 
nationalism, which became popular again in the 1950s and 1960s. According to 
nationalism, Brazil should be autonomous in both domestic and foreign policies and the 
main purpose of governments should be “to identify, on the international stage, which 
foreign resources may be mobilized to meet the internal development imperative.”162 
Being autonomous here refers to “a foreign policy free from constraints imposed by 
158 E. Bradford Burns, “Tradition and Variation in Brazilian Foreign Policy,” Journal of Inter-
American Studies 9 no. 2 (April 1967), 195. 
159 Vidigal, “Brazil: A Cordial Power?” 35. 
160 Cervo, “Political Regimes and Brazil’s Foreign Policy,” 344. 
161 Ibid., 346. 
162 Vidigal, “Brazil: A Cordial Power?” 36. 
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powerful countries.”163 Brazil has continued to seek autonomy in three ways from that 
time on: autonomy by distance, autonomy by participation, and autonomy by 
diversification. Their definitions will be given in detail in the relevant sections.164 
B. BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE COLD WAR 
1. The First or Old Republic (1889‒1930) 
This period can be defined as the era of the “consolidation of national space,” and 
the foundation of the basic guidelines of Brazil’s contemporary foreign policy.165 Brazil 
experienced a regime change in 1889 that resulted in an axis shift in its foreign policy. 
Until the establishment of the first republic in this year, Europe was the dominant power 
in both the domestic and foreign policies of Brazil. The European capitalist states were 
very effective in the region, especially between 1808, in which the Portuguese Court 
moved to Rio de Janerio, and 1844, in which trade treaties with Britain expired. Between 
those years, Brazil had to sign around twenty one-sided agreements that only served 
European interests. These treaties not only helped the European states enforce their 
interests and the rules of their international society in the region, but they also made 
Brazil highly dependent on European states in its foreign policy.166 However, in the 
second half of the century, the balance of power started to change gradually in favor of 
the United States. Brazil experienced a transition from empire to republic on November 
15, 1889, with the deposition of Emperor Dom Pedro II by Marshal Deodoro da 
Fonseca.167 The monarch was dethroned not because of foreign policy but because of 
Brazil’s failure to modernize during the 19th century.168 The proponents of the republic 
163 Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni, Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times, translated by 
Leandro Moura (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2009), 1. 
164 Vigevani and Cepaluni, Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times, 8. 
165 Celso Lafer, “Brazilian Identity and Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future,” Daedalus 129, no. 
2 (Spring, 2000): 214. 
166 Cervo, “Political Regimes and Brazil’s Foreign Policy,” 348. 
167 Boris Fausto, A Concise History of Brazil (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 148. 
168 Thomas E. Skidmore, “Brazilian Foreign Policy under Vargas: A Case of Regime Type 
Irrelevance,” in Foreign Policy and Political Regime, ed. by Jose Flavio Sombra Saraiva (Brasilia: Instituto 
Brasiliro de Relacoes Internacionais, 2003), 323. 
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believed that Brazil could not be a hemispheric economic power with a monarchy.169 
Europe, particularly Britain, did not warmly receive the new administration at that time, 
which strengthened ties between the United States and Brazil. That was why, to get 
foreign credits and to ensure the recognition of the new formation of the country as a 
republic, the new rulers considered it necessary to establish a constitution compatible 
with Western values. This attempt of the government was important to show Europe’s 
ongoing impact on the region. The replacement of the Brazilian delegate with Salvador 
de Mendonca in the First International Congress of the Americas in Washington, D.C., 
who was known to have similar views with the United States, was a significant milestone 
in Brazil’s track change in foreign relations.170 The assignment of Baron Rio Branco, 
who was considered to be “father of Brazilian diplomacy,”171 to the Ministry of 
Foreign Relations had been another important landmark in Brazil’s diplomatic shift 
from London to Washington. He worked with four different presidents as Brazil’s 
foreign minister from 1902 to 1912 and had been the most important political figure in 
Brazil’s foreign policy throughout the 20th century. He attempted to transform Brazil 
into a significant player in its region and world by introducing a new foreign policy 
perspective, which later on became traditional and was adopted by almost all of his 
successors in the rest of the century. His foreign policy perspective was based on four 
main principles: “Close relations with the United States; Pan Americanism; Latin 
American leadership; and international prestige.”172  
He completed the change of Brazil’s diplomatic focus from London to 
Washington and established close relationships with the United States. During the 19th 
century Britain dominated the financial and trade fields in Brazil and Brazilians took it as 
a model for the Second Empire. However, the United States started to throw its weight by 
the end of the century and became a new political advisor of Brazil with the adoption of 
the 1891 constitution. At the same time, North America replaced European capitalist 
169 Ibid. 
170Fausto, A Concise History of Brazil, 151. 
171 Ruy Castro, Rio de Janeiro: Carnival under Fire, translated by John Gledson (New York; London: 
Bloomsbury, 2004), 67. 
172Burns, “Tradition and Variation in Brazilian Foreign Policy,” 199. 
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states in Brazil’s export market. In addition, Brazilian elites, such as Segio Teixeira 
Macedo, Tavares Bastos, and Salavador de Mendoca, formulated society’s thoughts in 
favor of the United States by their works. All of these developments brought Brazil closer 
to the United States in the political, economic, and emotional fields. Anticipating that the 
United States would be a global power, Rio Franco believed that the best way to protect 
Brazil’s interest was by prioritizing its relationship with the United States in foreign 
policy. The United States responded in the same way and the two states sent ambassadors 
to each other in 1905.173 The other important reason that made the United States an 
appropriate partner was its similar perspective of opposition to the status quo as a rising 
power. Similar to the United States, Brazil was critical of the unfairness of international 
system at that time. According to Branco, this common ground would help Brazil change 
global order.174 
Due to its monarchical structure, Brazil was isolated from other parts of the 
hemisphere throughout the 19th century. But the convergence of the transition to republic 
in 1889 with the emergence of the modern Pan-American movement put an end to 
Brazil’s continental solitude. Brazil’s extraordinary efforts to consolidate association and 
cooperation between the American states under Rio-Branco’s guidance, including hosting 
the third Pan-American conference in 1906 in its capital, played a significant role in the 
development and maintenance of a Pan-American project and Brazil’s fusion with other 
states in the region. Rio-Branco also attempted to assume the leadership position in Latin 
America. With his efforts, Brazil established diplomatic missions in every state that did 
not have a Brazilian delegation until that time. He organized the recognition of Panama 
by Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina. Brazil also played a key role in arbitrating a 
disagreement between Peru and Ecuador, solving the Alsop claims issue between the 
United States and Chile, and convincing the United States to establish a permanent 
diplomatic mission to Paraguay. Moreover, Rio Branco tried to enhance Brazil’s status in 
the world by increasing the number of diplomats, attending critical international 
173 Ibid. 
174 Trinkunas, “Brazil’s Rise: Seeking Influence on Global Governance,” 11. 
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congresses like the Hague Peace Conference, and inviting prominent foreigners to the 
country.175 
During his era, Brazil managed to resolve 400-year-old border disputes with its 
neighbors, including Uruguay, Peru, and Colombia, through diplomacy. In that period, 
Brazil confronted Bolivia regarding the sovereignty of an Amazonian territory, Acre, 
which became suddenly valuable due to the rubber boom. Despite the fact that Acre was 
mainly inhabited by Brazilians, it was considered Bolivia’s district. Eventually, in 1903, 
Brazil and Bolivia signed the Treaty of Petropolis, in which Bolivia accepted Brazil’s 
authority in Acre in return for 2.5 million pounds.176 He also laid the foundations for the 
Brazil-U.S. partnership “which was to be touchstone of the Brazilian foreign policy for 
the rest of the century.”177 In the pre-World War I era, Brazil tried to be a significant 
international player by increasing its military power—particularly its naval power— and 
monopolizing the international coffee market. On the one hand, it bought two ultra-
modern battleships in 1904, which transformed it into a major naval force in the world. 
On the other hand, it tried to manipulate coffee prices to strengthen its economic position 
in the international arena.178 Word War I was important for Brazil for two main reasons. 
First, the war increased the demand and prices of raw materials, which was very 
beneficial for Brazil’s economy.179 Second, it was the first significant opportunity for 
Brazil to become involved in international issues with great powers. To protect its trade, 
largely of coffee, Brazil preferred to stay neutral at first.180 Germany’s attacks on 
Brazil’s merchant ships off the Brazilian coast in 1917 marked the end of Brazil’s 
neutrality. This time, to benefit from the victory, Brazil declared war and made a 
symbolic attempt to take part in the war by establishing a field hospital. Its efforts during 
the war increased the expectations of the government in the sense that they became the 
175 Burns, “Tradition and Variation in Brazilian Foreign Policy,” 197‒199. 
176  Fausto, A Concise History of Brazil, 152. 
177 Skidmore, “Brazilian Foreign Policy under Vargas,” 324. 
178 Ibid. 




                                                 
equal of the great powers and they should become a permanent member of National 
League. With this in mind, President Artur Bernardes made a speech in Brazil’s Congress 
and said that “great harmony of action in both America and Europe, where our entry into 
war gave us a position of real distinction.”181 Brazil’s attempt to be a permanent member 
in the National League ended up with great frustration. Spanish America’s lack of 
support played a significant role in this defeat. In 1926, due this great disappointment, 
Brazil left the National League permanently. But in terms of its economic interests, it 
continued to have an aspiration to be an international player in the rest of the century.182 
2. Vargas Era (1930‒1945) 
Getulio Vargas assumed the presidency on November 3, 1930, which marked the 
end of the First Republic and the start of an authoritarian era.183 As it was in the 
establishment of the First Republic, economic reasons set the stage for his presidency. He 
was defined as “Machiavellian, a chameleon, and a sphinx,” by his opponents.184 This 
definition and his interpretation of diplomatic relations as a selfish economic game of 
developed powers reflected the essence of Brazilian foreign policy in his era.185 Under 
his presidency, Brazil’s foreign trade policy was shaped by three principles:  
Firstly to take advantage of the rivalry between the antagonistic blocs that 
divided the world, with the intent to increase internal competition and 
external bargaining power; secondly to maintain liberal trade with the 
United States,  forcing this country to take decisions that were required by 
Brazil’s new bargaining power; thirdly, to carry out barer trade with 
Germany and Italy, which was considered more adequate to the expansion 
of national industry.186 
By the end of the World War I, authoritarian and totalitarian movements started to 
emerge in Europe. Mussolini assumed power in Italy in 1922. Likewise, Lenin was 
181Skidmore, “Brazilian Foreign Policy under Vargas,” 326. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Fausto, A Concise History of Brazil, 191. 
184Skidmore, “Brazilian Foreign Policy under Vargas,” 327. 
185 Cervo, “Political Regimes and Brazil’s Foreign Policy,” 351. 
186 Ibid., 350. 
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elected as president in 1917 and Stalin came to power in 1928 in the USSR. Moreover, 
Nazis took control in Germany in 1933. At that time, people started to see liberal 
democracy and capitalism as responsible for unemployment and poverty. The perception 
of the roles of capitalism and liberal democracy in the global economic depression helped 
the aforementioned regimes strengthen their positions.187 The Great Depression in 1929 
hastened the fall of British hegemony, and increased that of the United States. In the 
same period, the international arena witnessed the rise of Nazi Germany in 1933. At that 
time, Brazil tried to follow pragmatic policies by utilizing the competition among the 
great powers. As a result of this perception, Germany remarkably increased its share in 
Brazilian foreign trade between 1934 and 1940. Germany ranked first in Brazil’s cotton 
exportation and second in Brazil’s coffee exportation. Germany’s increase in Brazil’s 
importation was more remarkable. Its share in Brazil’s importation was 13 percent in 
1929, while the United States’ share was 30 percent. By the year 1938, Germany’s share 
increased to 25 percent, and the United States share decreased to 24 percent. In the same 
year, the United States’ share in Brazil’s exportation was 34 percent, while Germany’s 
share in Brazil’s exportation was 19 percent. At that time, in addition to Germany’s 
significant role in Brazil’s exportation, Brazilians believed that they were desperately in 
need of Germany’s support for industrialization and modernization. In response, 
Germany tried to weaken Brazil’s relations with the great powers.188 
In response to Brazil’s strong economic ties with Germany, the American public 
wanted its government to take severe measures to punish Brazil economically. However, 
Roosevelt refused to put into effect that kind of measure for fear of making Brazil an ally 
with Germany. Two camps emerged in that period in Brazil: American supporters and 
Germany sympathizers. Similar to previous period, Brazil continued to follow pragmatic 
policies, but by the end of the 1930s, Vargas showed his preference in foreign policy by 
assigning Osvaldo Aranha, who was known to be in the American camp, as minister of 
foreign affairs. This preference marked the beginning of the decline in Brazil-Germany 
187 Fausto, A Concise History of Brazil,” 209. 
188 Ibid., 226. 
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relations. The Brazilian government declared the German ambassador as persona non 
grata and deported him.189  
The eruption of World War II had been a significant determinant in Brazil’s 
foreign policy in the Vargas era. German trade in Latin America remarkably decreased 
due to Britain’s blockade. The United States took advantage of this decrease and 
strengthened its position in the region. Before the beginning of World War II, due to 
security concerns, the United States tried to gather the American states under the 
umbrella of Pan-American Conferences, regardless of their regime types. These attempts 
brought Brazil closer to the United States. However, Brazil continued to be pragmatist in 
its foreign policy. With the United States entrance to the war in 1941, it openly took the 
side of the Americans in exchange for economic and military support. In the same year, 
the United States opened military bases in the northern part of Brazil without waiting for 
official permission from the Brazilian government. At the beginning of 1942, despite the 
opposition of some members of the military high command, Brazil abruptly ended its 
relations with the Axis. In the same year in May, it signed a clandestine military and 
political agreement with the United States. The German attacks on five Brazilian 
merchant ships from August 5 to 17 were the straw that broke the camel’s back and 
forced Brazil to enter to the war in the same month. Moreover, without the demand of the 
Allies, Brazil sent an expeditionary unit called the Forca Expedicionaria Brasileira (FEB) 
to fight with the American 5th Army in Northern Italy on its own.190 By doing so, the 
Brazilian government intended to clear away Britain’s opposition and U.S. restrictions. 
Brazil participated in the fight in Europe with more than 20,000 troops. By the middle of 
the 1940s, Britain was no longer Brazil’s primary trading partner. France lost its impact 
on Brazilian culture and Germany was no longer a significant provider of capital goods. 
All these vacuums were filled by the United States.191 
Despite the fact that Brazil was one of the few South American nations that 
played an active role in the war, it failed to get a permanent seat in the UN Security 
189 Ibid., 227. 
190 Skidmore, “Brazilian Foreign Policy under Vargas,” 339. 
191 Ibid. 
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Council and had to be content as one of the founding members of the United Nations due 
to the developed states’ reluctance to share their powers.192 
C. BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR ERA 
1. The Second Brazilian Republic or the Republic of ‘46 (1946‒1964) 
The competition between communism and capitalism shaped Brazil’s foreign 
policy in this era. The Cold War between two superpowers restricted room for 
maneuvering in the international arena for Latin American states that sought development 
through diversification. Economic dependence on the Western bloc strengthened U.S. 
authority over the region and forced Latin American countries to become partners in the 
United States American system project, which was realized through the signing of the 
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance in 1947 and the establishment of 
Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948. The former arranged the military issues, 
while the latter dealt with regional diplomatic negotiations. With the start of the Cold 
War, the United States developed new policies against the Communist threat that shaped 
Latin American foreign policies in general and Brazil’s policies in particular. The United 
States attempted to “to preclude Soviet ideological, economic and military penetration; 
promote internal stability for friendly governments, regardless of their dictatorial or 
democratic nature; secure the continuity of the raw materials trade to U.S. industry; and 
assure Latin American support for Washington’s foreign policy,” through these new 
policies.193 During this era, Brazil continued to be critical of the unfairness of the 
international system. From 1946 to 1964, it tried to increase foreign relations with newly-
emerged states that were also critical of the international order. However, the military 
coup of 1964 marked the end of this attempt and delayed it until the beginning of the 21st 
century.194 
192 Paul M. Edwards, “United Nations Participants in the Korean War: The Contributions of 45 
Member Countries,” Library of Congress, 2013, 168‒169. 
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After authoritarian rule for sixteen years, Brazil re-adopted democracy as a 
regime type in 1946. In the economic field, it tried to increase its relations with the great 
powers of international capitalism, while in the ideological and political fields it adopted 
Western values that were suggested by the United States. The new government 
renounced the ideas of the first Vargas era and accepted the dominance of the West.195 
Similar to its neighbors, the Cold War prevented Brazil from finding new trade partners 
and starting new financial relations. Due to international conditions, Brazil could not 
establish commercial relations with either the Soviet Union or with newly independent 
countries.196 Despite the fact that U.S. security policies undermined Brazil’s 
development intentions, Brazil continued to be in line with them. With the beginning of 
the Cold War, Eurico Gaspar Dutra government started to suppress the Communist Party 
mostly due to changing balances among developed powers. It prohibited the activities of 
the Communist Party in 1947 and tried to remove all of the traces of communism in the 
country. Actually, the government’s concern was weakening domestic opposition, which 
was comprised of communism-supporting unions, in the name of struggling with 
Communism. In the economic field, the Dutra government began to move away from 
Estado Novo and follow more liberal policies.197 
On January 31, 1951, the second Vargas era began after an election and continued 
until he committed suicide in 1954.198 Vargas mainly attempted to follow the same 
nationalist policies he had followed earlier, but in a different regime. Since Brazil became 
a democracy, unlike in his previous experience, he tried to strike a balance among 
different groups. For example, topics such as the internal political economy and Brazil’s 
foreign policy caused an ideological split within the army. These ideological factions 
emerged as nationalists and their adversaries, who were known as “capitulaters” or 
entreguistas. In terms of foreign relations, the nationalists advocated the idea of opposing 
the United States, while their rivals were in favor of unconditionally moving together 
195 Cervo, “Political Regimes and Brazil’s Foreign Policy,” 360. 
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with the United States against Communism. In the beginning, Vargas nominated a 
nationalist former officer and president of the Clube Militar, Estillac Leal, to be the 
minister of war, which was one of the most important ministries that had a significant 
impact on Brazil’s foreign policy. Yet the struggle between nationalists and their 
adversaries ended with the victory of latter when their candidate became director of the 
Clube Militar in 1952. In the same period, the struggle between the West and 
Communism that continued in different fronts resulted in Korean War.199 
When the Korean War broke out, Brazil was in the middle of moving its capital 
from Rio de Janerio to the center due to economic reasons. Like other United Nation 
members, Brazil’s government admitted the war as an attack on a member state and 
supported UN intervention. Although, at the beginning, it seemed eager to fulfill the 
requirements of the UN that were stated in Article 49 of the charter,200 no matter the cost, 
including sending troops to the military force created by the UN to take active role in 
Korea. But when it came to turning words into deeds, Brazil looked for a way out of the 
mission by responding evasively. As stated in the State Department memo of 
conversation, Brazil offered to assist the military force of the UN without openly defining 
the time and size of its support. That is why the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not take this 
offer into consideration at that time.201 
After the end of the second Vargas era, significant events such as the Suez crisis 
and the Hungarian Revolution set the stage for Brazil to follow more nationalist 
policies.202 In that period, Juscelino Kubitschek, president of Brazil from 1956 to 1961, 
continued to be in line with the United States. Paulo Visentini divides the Kubitscheck 
era in to two phases: “(1) 1956‒1958, a period of automatic alignment with the U.S.; (2) 
199 Ibid., 243‒44. 
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from mid-1958 to 1961, a period of nationalistic bargaining with the U.S.”203 During his 
administration, Kubitscheck made military and diplomatic concessions in exchange for 
technical assistance and financial support. On the one hand, Brazil’s agreement to let the 
United States use the archipelago of Fernando de Noronha as a military base and to send 
a military expeditionary force to the Middle East for a peacekeeping operation following 
the Suez crisis were two remarkable military concessions of that time. On the other hand, 
in the diplomatic field, the implementation of the Operation Pan-America (OPA), which 
prioritized regional relations and attempted to find solutions to Brazil’s weak economy 
through multilateral policies, was the one of the most important diplomatic events of 
Kubitscheck’s period that showed how the United States dominated Brazilian foreign 
policy. Moreover, Brazil’s attempts to be arbitrator between Cuba and the United States 
in 1961 were significant signs of its desire to assume regional leadership.204  
2. Military Rule (1964‒1985) 
On March 31, 1964, the Brazilian military established a dictatorship that would 
last until 1985 in a so-called effort “to free the country from corruption and communism 
and to restore democracy.”205 It is possible to divide this era into two phases, 1964‒1969 
and 1969‒1985, in terms of its foreign policy tendencies.  
When Castelo Branco assumed power in 1964, he openly declared that Brazil 
would follow traditional policies, according to which world peace, disarmament, self-
determination, non-intervention, and anti-colonialism would be the main principles. He 
also stated that his administration’s foreign policy intended to enhance national power 
through economic and social improvements.206 Similar to the second republic period, in 
the first three years of the military regime Brazil’s foreign policy continued to be parallel 
to that of the United States under his administration. Castelo Branco’s statement that “in 
order to worthily represent Brazil abroad, you need to have nothing more before you than 
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the teachings of Rio-Branco” was sufficient to define his perspective on foreign 
policy.207 Under his presidency, Brazil continued to make concessions in return for 
developmental aid. Brazil’s military support to the United States in the name of “Inter-
American Peace Work” to end the civil war in the Dominican Republic in the years of 
1965‒1966 was important to show the continuity in Brazil’s foreign policy during his 
era.208 After Castelo Branco, Costa e Silva became president in 1967. There were 
authoritarian nationalists and hardliners in the Brazilian army who supported Costa e 
Silva in the hope that he would change Branco’s U.S.-oriented policies. However, Costa 
e Silva disappointed them by following policies that were more liberal than expected.209 
Brazil achieved a substantial amount of economic development during the first period of 
military rule. But, due to economic growth, Brazil became highly dependent on the 
international trade and monetary system, as well as some imported products, particularly 
petroleum.210 
In the second phase of military rule, the nationalists’ ideas from the 1930s rose 
again in the form of autonomy by distance.211 Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni 
define autonomy by distance as  
a policy of contesting the norms and principles of important international 
institutions (IMF, World Bank, GATT, etc.); a diplomacy that opposes the 
liberalizing agenda of the great powers, particularly the United States; the 
belief in autarchical development, guided by the expansion of the 
domestic market and by economic protectionism; resistance to 
international regimes interpreted as freezing world power, in favor of the 
status quo.212 
On the one hand, economic concerns continued to be the essence of foreign 
policy.213 On the other hand, the relative decline of U.S. power, the economic resurgence 
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of Japan and Western Europe, the increasing effects of Third World in the international 
arena, particularly in the UN and General Agreements on Tariff and Trade (GATT), and 
the softening of relations between socialist and capitalist poles were the main factors that 
shaped Brazil’s foreign policy in that phase.214 During 1970s, Brazil tried to stay away 
from the United States politically. It maintained its economic development that started in 
1960s and became one of the main arms exporters to great powers. It also started a 
nuclear program for both peaceful and military purposes that was supported by Germany 
in spite of the United States’ disapproval. Moreover, it rejected the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty supported by the United States on account of the fact that it 
would increase inequality in the international order.215 
D. BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR 
1. 1985‒1995 
After the rule by a military regime for 21 years, Brazil made the transition to 
democracy when Jose Sarney assumed power in 1985. Unlike the second re-
democratization period, Sarney continued to follow nationalist policies and to use 
“autonomy by distance” methods of former military regime at the beginning.216 Due to 
the great debt crisis that was inherited from the former regime, Brazil focused on 
economic development and stability in this period.217 In the late 1980s near the end of the 
Cold War, the spread and increase of liberal values through globalization and the 
domestic economic impasse forced Brazil to change its foreign policy from the concept 
of “autonomy by distance” to the concept of “autonomy by participation,” which means 
“growing interaction, negotiation, and participation in the formulation of international 
norms and rules.”218 Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni define this concept more 
broadly as:  
214Vigevani and Cepaluni, Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times, 5. 
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adherence to international regimes, including those of a liberal slant (such 
as the WTO), without losing the capacity to manage foreign policy. In this 
case, the objective would be to influence the very formulation of the 
principles and rules governing the international system. It is felt that the 
national objectives would be more effectively achieved along these 
paths.219 
The years between 1990 and 1995 were a transition period in which Brazil started 
to abandon long-established foreign policy ideas. After Sarney, Collor De Mello became 
president in 1990. Neither he nor his successor, Itamar Franco (in office between 1992 
and 1995), could develop a consistent foreign policy because of economic and political 
instability. In their era, Brazil rejected its traditional foreign policy perspective and 
started to adopt the “autonomy through participation” concept by opening Brazil’s market 
to the world and supporting free trade. By doing so, they sought to consolidate Brazil’s 
relations with great powers, particularly the United States. They prioritized economic 
relations with the United States, which transformed it into Brazil’s main trading partner at 
that time. These presidents not only attempted to increase Brazil’s relations with the 
developed world, but also continued to attach importance to regional interactions, which 
resulted in the establishment of Mercosur with the involvement of Argentina, Paraguay, 
and Uruguay in 1991. During this period, Brazil became more familiar with concepts 
such as human rights and preservation of the environment, which set the stage for more 
participation in international issues. This period was important because these presidents 
laid the foundations of Brazil’s new foreign policy that was shaped by their successors 
Fernando Henrique Cardozo and Lula da Silva.220 
2. The Fernando Henrique Cardozo Era (1995‒2003) 
Fernando Henrique Cardozo had a great impact on Brazilian foreign policy, first 
as Itamar Franco’s foreign minister between 1992 and 1993 and later as president from 
1995 to 2003.221 He completed the transition from the “autonomy by distance” policy to 
219Ibid., 7. 
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“autonomy by participation.”222 Brazil changed the isolated and nationalist policies of 
previous authoritarian regimes under his leadership and started to work hard to increase 
its international credibility.223 On the one hand, Brazil began to follow proactive foreign 
policies instead of reactive ones in his era. On the other hand, economic development 
remained at the center of foreign relations.224 During his era, Brazil’s economy 
connected to international institutions and the OECD state’s economic interests.225 He 
focused on improving Brazil’s position in international commerce and laid the 
foundations for Brazil’s multilateral policies of Lula’s era.226 Cardozo gave Europe and 
the United States precedence in Brazil’s relations but he did not neglect South 
America.227 He saw the Unites States as Brazil’s primary partner due to its role in the 
international order and attempted to improve Brazil’s relations with it.228 During his 
presidency, Brazil accepted the Missile Technology Control Regime and signed the 
Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons that brought it closer to the United 
States.229 On the other hand, as an indicator of his prioritization of relations with Latin 
America, he organized a summit for South American leaders in Brazil in 2000 that laid 
the foundations for the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR).230  
3. The Lula da Silva Era (2003‒2010) 
In the early 21st century, the waning of the post-Cold War unipolar system and 
the emergence of new actors in the international arena provided Brazil a new opportunity 
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for growing and urged it to replace “the autonomy through participation,” policies with 
“autonomy through diversification.”231 Vigevani and Cepaluni define autonomy by 
diversification as  
adherence of the country to international principles and norms by means 
of South-South alliances, including regional ones, and of agreements with 
non-traditional partners, such as China, Asia-Pacific, Africa, Eastern 
Europe, Middle East etc. The aim is to reduce asymmetries and increase 
the country’s international bargaining capacity in its relations with more 
powerful countries, such as the USA and European Union (EU) countries. 
An important characteristic is the capacity to negotiate with more 
powerful countries without ruptures, with the perspective of breaking 
unilateralism and striving for multi-polarity and equilibrium.232 
Development, democracy, and diversification had been three main components of 
Lula’s foreign policy. During this era, Brazil tried to internationalize its companies, 
diversify foreign ties, and take greater roles in international mechanisms. Economic 
development continued to be the main purpose of foreign policy. In this era, Brazil 
sought to find new trading partners and take active roles in the establishment of new 
international agencies such as BRIC, IBSA, and G20.233 Different from Cardozo, Lula 
prioritized cooperation with Asian and African states, in addition to Latin American ones. 
He paid more than 70 percent of his official trips to these regions.234 Moreover, during 
his era, Brazil intensified its foreign financial aid and technical missions to these 
countries.235 
E. CONCLUSION 
Since the establishment of the first republic in 1889, particularly after the 1930s, 
economic concerns have been the main determinants in shaping Brazilian foreign policy, 
regardless of regime types. During that first period, Brazil preferred to follow more 
pacifist, legalist, and pragmatic policies. The principles that guided Brazilian foreign 
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policy date back to the early 20th century. On the other hand, Brazil has always been 
critical of the unjustness of the international system. Given that it has not been a self-
sufficient country and strong enough to change the international order on its own, it has 
adjusted its foreign policies to the emerging opportunities that have been created by 
competition among great powers. In the 1930s, after securing its territory and solving 
border problems, Brazil started to seek autonomy in its foreign relations and to use 
diplomacy and foreign policy as instruments for economic development. It used three 
main methods: autonomy through distance, autonomy through participation, and 
autonomy through diversification. Despite Brazil’s efforts for autonomy, it has always 
been dependent on the United States in its foreign policy with some exceptions. The 
emergence of new global actors at the beginning of the 21st century has decreased U.S. 
impact on Brazil and opened room for free maneuvers in the international arena. With the 
waning of the unipolar system, Brazil has had the opportunity to diversify its relations 




IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 2010 IRAN-TURKEY-BRAZIL 
NUCLEAR DEAL FOR TURKEY 
Iran first met with nuclear energy by dint of the United States in 1950s when Shah 
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi signed an agreement with the Dwight D. Eisenhower 
government under the program of U.S. Atoms for Peace, according to which the United 
States committed to establish a nuclear research reactor and power plants in Iran.236 Iran 
started to work on its nuclear program for peaceful purposes. Before long, however, Shah 
Reza Pehlevi began to demand to use it in developing nuclear weapons on the grounds 
that Iran needed this kind of high-level weaponry to protect its territory against external 
threats.237  Considering Iran’s strategic position in the region, such as its oil reserves and 
significant position against Soviet expansionism, the U.S. government reluctantly 
accepted Iran’s request and helped to establish necessary infrastructure.238 In addition to 
the United States, prominent European states, including Britain, France, and Germany, 
played important roles in this engagement.239 During the 1960s and 1970s, Iran acquired 
significant scientific capability to develop the technological infrastructure of nuclear 
works through the agency of these great powers.240 However, it signed the NPT and 
became a non-nuclear weapon state in 1970.241 The Islamic revolution in 1979 changed 
the regime and Imam Khomeini became the leader of Iran. From that time on, the 
strategic partnership between Iran and the West turned into strategic hostility. The regime 
change and new rulers’ denial of everything Western interrupted the nuclear program of 
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Iran.242 In addition, the Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988 was another factor that 
disrupted the nuclear program of Iran.243 However, war with Iraq revealed the necessity 
for nuclear energy to meet the requirements of domestic consumption and motivated Iran 
to secretly restart its nuclear programs in 1984.244 Since Western states supported Iraq 
during the war, by the 1990s Iran turned to China and Russia, which have supported 
Iran’s right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes so far, to maintain its program.245  
During the 1990s, the United States started to express its concerns over Iran’s 
nuclear program and to take some measures on its own, such as imposing sanctions. 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, it has increased its pressure on Iran and begun to 
claim that Iran has reached the technological capacity to develop nuclear weapons.246 
Discovery of the uranium enrichment facility with the support of an opposition group in 
Natanz and the water production facility in Arak in 2002 was a turning point for world 
public opinion.247 Until this discovery, other states were not very interested in the U.S. 
claims, but after this discovery, they actively allied themselves with the United States. 
The United States considered the facilities in Natanz and Arak as indicators of Iran’s 
secret nuclear weapon development program and an obvious breach of the NPT.248 
Fearing a U.S. invasion of Iraq, Iran accepted the inspections of IAEA and partly 
suspended its nuclear program in 2003.249 The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who 
was known for his overt hostility towards Israel and the United States, was the other 
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turning point in Iran’s nuclear program. In 2006, Iran resumed production in Natanz, 
which stimulated IAEA to bring the issue to the UN Security Council. From 2006 to the 
2010, the UN Security council adopted three resolutions that specified sanctions for 
Iran.250 During that period, every diplomatic effort, including five permanent members of 
the UN Security Council (the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain) and 
Germany’s attempt in 2009, failed to convince Iran to negotiate its nuclear program 
according to NPT standards.  
When there was no hope for diplomacy to solve the issue, on May 17, 2010, 
Brazil and Turkey convinced Iran to come to the table and negotiate its nuclear program 
under the same conditions which were offered by the P5+Germany a couple of months 
before. Turkey and Brazil’s success was a historic event, but the P5+Germany did not 
recognize the agreement, alleging that Iran played for time. They adopted the fourth 
rounds of sanctions against Iran anyway, which left this attempt fruitless. Although the 
deal ended with failure and missed the chance to be an historic event, it continued to be 
significant for Turkey and Brazil in itself. This chapter seeks to examine the significance 
of this deal for Turkey and argues that the deal was important for Turkey both politically 
and economically. The deal was politically significant for Turkey, first because it was 
seen by Turkish policy makers as an important step towards becoming a global power 
and to meet the requirements of new Turkish foreign policy principles. Second, Turkey 
and Iran are historically rivals, and by playing a key role in solving problems between 
Iran and the West, Turkey sought to move one step forward in the struggle for regional 
leadership. Third, a nuclear Iran was a big threat for Turkey’s security and regional 
balances. According to Turkey, nuclear Iran may start a nuclear arms race in the region 
and it may lead the United States to intervene. Both scenarios were threatening regional 
stability, which would have negative impacts on Turkey’s global ambitions and regional 
policies, as seen in the previous Iraq wars. Since Turkey was unable to prevent Iran on its 
own from developing nuclear weapons and to convince the United States not to use 
military power, it attempted to use diplomacy. For Turkey, the deal also made sense 
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economically. First, the sanctions had negative impacts on economic relations between 
Turkey and Iran. Turkey sought to prevent sanctions and increase its relations with Iran 
by solving the issue. Second, Turkey was highly dependent on the outside in terms of oil 
and natural gas. A tension between Iran and Western states, particularly the United 
States, had a high potential to increase oil prices, which may have caused a huge deficit 
in Turkey’s budget. Finally, if Turkey could solve the disagreement between Iran and 
West, Iran could sell its oil to the world without any restrictions, which would turn 
Turkey into an energy bridge. 
A. POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
1. Turkey’s Ambitions to be a Regional Power  
The power structure of the world considerably changed since 19th century. From 
that time on, imperial collapses led to power vacuums that set the stage for a new 
international order. Regional and global powers tried to fill these vacuums by adapting 
their policies to new conditions.251 As a result of these changes, from the 19th century to 
21st century, the world witnessed four systems—balance-of-power, multi-polarity, 
bipolarity, and unipolarity— that have been one of the main determinants of the foreign 
policy of the Ottoman Empire and its successor, Turkey.252 While the world was multi-
polar before the Second World War and Britain, France, and Germany were the dominant 
powers, it become bipolar after the war, for power was shared by the United States and 
the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The end of the Cold War marked the end of 
bipolarity and beginning of unipolarity, and was the most significant turning point for 
Turkish foreign policy.253 At the end of the Cold War, Turkey abandoned passive, 
reaction-based policies and re-emerged as a potential global power in the newly-
established international order. However, due to some domestic problems, such as weak 
coalitions and economic downturns, it failed to translate its leadership rhetoric into action 
251 Gozen, “Turkish Foreign Policy in Turbulence of the Post-Cold War Era: Impact of External and 
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until the election of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002. With the election 
of the AKP, Turkey has experienced a dramatic change in foreign policy, from just 
aiming to protect the borders of the nation-state and maintaining its presence to having 
global ambitions. 
First, the nuclear deal was politically significant for Turkey because it was 
considered by Turkish policy makers as an important step on the way to being a regional 
and global power.254 By convincing Iran, Turkey sought to do a job that could only be 
done by great powers.255 Ahmet Davutoglu, former foreign minister and current prime 
minister of Turkey, explains Turkey’s involvement in the nuclear deal with Iran in terms 
of the change in Turkey’s methodological and operational principles in foreign policy 
during the AKP era. According to Davutoglu and different from former administrations, 
Turkish foreign policy has been shaped by three methodological and five operational 
principles in the 21st century that set the stage for Turkey’s involvement in the 2010 
nuclear deal. In terms of methodology, Turkey has adopted visionary, consistent and 
systematic, and soft power-based foreign policy principles. Different from previous 
governments, Turkey abandoned reaction-based approaches and began to follow 
visionary ones, in which Turkey began to follow autonomous polices. Since then, it has 
started to make decisions according to its understanding of the events instead of trying to 
counterbalance other states. As a second methodological principle, Turkey adopted a 
consistent and systematic perspective by which its policies against different parts of the 
world do not contradict each other. Its vision for Asia does not differ from its vision for 
the Balkans. That is why it has been trying to improve its relations with Europe and other 
states such as Iraq, Greece, Syria and, the Russia Federation at the same time. For the 
third methodological principle, Turkey adopted soft power-based policies in its foreign 
relations. According to this principle, although it keeps a strong military, Turkey gives 
precedence to its civil-economic power and aims to increase its economic relations with 
its neighbors. In addition to these three methodological principles, after the election of 
the AKP, Turkey has adopted five operational principles in foreign policy: balance 
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255 Ibid. 
 63 
                                                 
between security and democracy, zero problems towards neighbors, proactive and 
preemptive peace diplomacy, adherence to multidimensional foreign policy, and 
rhythmic diplomacy. According to the balance between security and democracy principle, 
Turkey has opposed the policies that limit freedoms in the cause of security and has 
sought to promote freedoms and human rights without weakening security. As a second 
operational principle, Turkey put into practice a zero problems policy and has attempted 
to solve its deep-rooted problems with its neighbors. It established high-level-strategic 
boards with Greece, Syria, Iraq, and Russia and canceled the need for visas with many 
states, including Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Russia, which set the stage for a remarkable 
increase in economic and political relations. Moreover, Turkey has adopted proactive and 
preemptive peace diplomacy, according to which it attempts to take precautions before 
problems appear. Its mediator role between Israel and Syria, Sunni-Shiite settlement in 
Iraq, ceasefire affords in Palestine and Lebanon, and reconciliation attempts between 
Bosnia and Serbia are important examples of these principle. For the fourth operational 
principle, Turkey has adopted multi-dimensional foreign policy. According to this 
principle, it maintains its relations with the West through the EU while it increases its 
relations with other parts of the world, including Russia and China. Rhythmic diplomacy 
is the fifth operational principle that has shaped Turkish foreign policy in the 21st 
century. In accordance with this principle, Turkey has begun to be more active in the 
international arena through global organizations. It was elected to the UN Security 
Council with 151 votes in the first round in 2008. Moreover, in 2009 and 2010, Turkey 
assumed the leadership position in South-East European Cooperation process, which was 
founded to promote dialogue among Balkan states. It also actively took part in the Arab 
league and became a member of G-20, which is considered as the symbol of economic 
success. It opened 15 new embassies in Africa and two new embassies in Latin 
America.256 
Considering the changing principles of Turkish foreign policy in the 21st century, 
it is possible to say that Turkey’s engagement in the nuclear deal was the result of these 
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Foreign Affairs, May 20, 2010, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/article-by-h_e_-ahmet-davutoglu-published-in-
foreign-policy-magazine-_usa_-on-20-may-2010.en.mfa. 
 64 
                                                 
changes that are applied to turn Turkey into a global power. In other words, the deal was 
significant for Turkey because it was seen as necessary to provide continuity in new 
foreign policy perceptions and considered by Turkish policy makers an important step 
toward becoming a global power.  
2. The Rivalry between Turkey and Iran for Regional Leadership 
Second, the nuclear deal was politically significant for Turkey because it was an 
important step in the Turkish-Iranian rivalry.257 If Iran could solve the issue on its own, 
as it did in 2013, Turkey would lose its importance in the eyes of great powers as a 
strategic ally, and Iran would move one step further in the regional leadership rivalry. On 
the other hand, if the deal succeeded, it could consolidate “Turkey’s beneficent regional 
role as a mediator and peace-maker,”258 and help Turkey to increase its role in regional 
and global leadership. So, by engaging in the deal, Turkey attempted to control Iran’s 
influence in the region as a significant regional leadership opponent.259 
The relationship between Turkey and Iran has been mostly characterized by 
rivalry.260 Although since the election of the AKP, the relations with Iran have followed 
an increasingly positive pattern, the nuclear deal with Iran was one of the very few 
examples when the two states collaborated actively in history.261 The two neighbors’ 
struggles date back to the Ottoman and Safavid Empires eras in the 16th century when 
the Shiite Persian Safavid’s expansionist policies conflicted with the Sunni Ottoman 
Empire’s interests.262 Turks engaged in wars with Iranians more than any other states, 
including its permanent rival Russia, between 1514 and 1823.263 Although the Treaty of 
Kasr’i Shirin in 1639 decreased the tension a little bit and drew the current boundaries, 
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contrary to common belief, it did not completely eliminate rivalry. By the first half of the 
19th century, both states’ rivalry played second fiddle to European expansionism. By the 
mid-19th century, the Ottoman Empire’s capital became a shelter for Iranian insurgents 
and opposition groups.264 In the same period, however, Iran allowed Armenian 
nationalists to use its territories for preparations of raids against the Ottoman Empire.265 
During World War 1, the Ottoman Empire occupied the Persian city of Tabriz, but it had 
to retreat at the end of the war due to its defeat, which urged Iran to demand territorial 
concessions from the Ottoman Empire at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919‒20.266 
From the establishment of Republic of Turkey in 1923 to the regime change in Iran in 
1979, the relations were relatively good.267 Particularly during the early years of the Cold 
War era, both states became regional allies against Soviet expansionism by establishing 
international organizations such as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the 
RCD, which became the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in 1985.268 
However, the regime change marked the end of improvements in relations when Iran 
attempted to export its regime to secular Turkey.269 From the 1980s to today, Turkey has 
accused Iran of supporting the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a terrorist group, while 
Iran accused Turkey of protecting political opposition groups such as Mujaheddin-e 
Khalq (People’s Warriors).270 The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 caused a power 
vacuum in Central Asia and the Caucasus and set the stage for another competition 
between Turkey and Iran.271 The two countries policies continued to conflict in these 
fields. In 1992, for instance, while Turkey supported Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-
Karabakh war, Iran took the side of Armenia.272 During the 1990s, Iran was considered a 
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serious threat to Turkey’s secular regime, and the Turkish secular elite accused Iran of 
killing famous secular intellectuals.273 When the Welfare Party (RP) assumed power on 
June 28, 1996, its leader Necmettin Erbakan made his first trip to Iran, and the new 
government’s Islamic-oriented policies increased concern about the regime in Turkey, 
which set the stage for military intervention on February 28, 1997.274 Although, the 
election of the AKP government softened the relations with Iran, the power struggle 
between Turkey and Iran continued in the 21st century. The deployment of patriot 
missiles in Turkey, Iran’s constant support for the PKK and the difference between both 
states perceptions of the Arab Spring uprisings are some of the main controversial topics 
between Turkey and Iran during the AKP era.275 So, in engaging in the nuclear deal with 
Iran, Turkey’s chief goal was to prevent Iran from becoming a strategic ally for Western 
states and to reinforce its regional leadership.276 
3. Nuclear-Iran as a Threat to Regional Balances 
Third, the nuclear deal was politically significant for Turkey because although the 
AKP government supports the idea of using nuclear energy for peaceful goals, Turkey 
does not want Iran to have the capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons.277 It considers 
nuclear weapons a big threat to stability in the region.278 According to Turkey, a nuclear 
Iran may cause a regional nuclear arms race.279 Moreover, the United States was 
planning to take various kinds of measures against Iran, from imposing sanctions to a 
military attack, which was viewed by Turkey with great skepticism on account of the fact 
that a military intervention in Iran might destabilize the region as it did in the Iraq war.280 
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Since Turkey was not capable on its own of preventing Iran from producing nuclear 
weapons and convincing the United States not to use hard power to solve the problem, it 
attempted to solve the issue through diplomacy.  
Although Iran’s nuclear program has been a controversial topic in the 
international system since the second half of the 1990s, Turkey preferred to be 
unresponsive to the issue for a long time.281 After the election of the AKP government, 
Turkey declared that it was supporting Iran’s right to use nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes.282 However, due to increasing pressure from the United States and Iran’s 
emergence as a threat to regional stability, by 2005 Turkey began to state its concerns 
publicly over Iran’s nuclear program and formalized its attitude by putting Iran’s nuclear 
works into a National Security Policy Document in 2005.283 In 2006, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Abdullah Gul declared that “the IAEA Director General’s reports have revealed 
the fact that Iran concealed its nuclear program for years, which creates suspicions about 
Iran’s intentions. The emergence of the possibility of Iran’s possessing a nuclear weapon 
disturbs Turkey as all the members of international society.”284 Considering a potential 
U.S.-Iran war and a nuclear arms race in the region, Turkey attempted to bring Iran to the 
table to negotiate its nuclear program. By doing so, it sought to maintain regional 
stability, which was important for its increased role in the international arena. 
B. ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE 
1. The Impact on Turkey of Sanctions on Iran 
One of the main economic reasons that made the nuclear deal significant for 
Turkey was the sanctions’ negative impacts on Turkey’s economic relations with Iran. By 
engaging in the deal, Turkey sought to prevent the UN Security Council from adopting a 
fourth round of sanctions and also trying to increase its economic relations with Iran. 
Sanctions negatively affected Turkey’s economy in three ways. First, they decreased the 
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trade volume between Turkey and Iran; second, they prevented Turkey’s multinationals 
to make investments in Iran; third, they caused a decrease in Iranian tourism to Turkey. 
a. Bilateral Trade  
Since the beginning of the 21st century, there has been a remarkable increase in 
bilateral trade between Turkey and Iran.285 Between the election of the AKP government 
in 2002 and 2011, trade volume increased more than tenfold from $1.25 billion to $16.05 
billion.286 However, sanctions reversed the increasing pattern in bilateral trade between 
Turkey and Iran (see Table 1 and Table 2).  
Table 1.   An Overview of Turkey-Iran Economic Relations since 2003.287  
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286 Jenkins, Occasional Allies, Enduring Rivals: Turkey’s Relations With Iran, 7. 
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Figure 1.  An Overview of Turkey-Iran Economic Relations since 2003.288 
As can be seen in the chart, there was a dramatic increase in Turkey’s exportation 
to Iran in 2012. In fact, this increase was misleading. Since sanctions did not include 
precious metals, Turkey began to pay for the oil and natural gas with gold to breach the 
sanctions and registered these transactions as its exportation to Iran.289 For an overview 
of Iran’s export and import relationships in 2013, see Tables 2 and 3. 
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Table 2.   Top Five States in Iran’s Export in 2013.290  
TOP 5 STATES IN IRAN’S EXPORT IN 2013 
STATE 
IRAN’S EXPORT 
(2013) (BILLION ) 
STATE’S SHARE 
 IN IRAN’S  
EXPORT (2013) (%) 
1) CHINA 25.4 40.4 
2) TURKEY 10.38 16.5 
3) INDIA 10.03 15.9 
4) JAPAN 6.93 11 
5) SOUTH KOREA 5.56 8.8 
Iran’s total exports in 2013 = $62.92 billion 
Table 3.   Top 5 States in Iran’s Import in 2013.291 








 SHARE IN  
IRAN’S 
IMPORT (2013) (%) 
1) CHINA 14.39 31.6 
2) INDIA 5.43 11.9 
3) SOUTH KOREA 4.48 9.8 
4) TURKEY 4.19 9.2 
5) GERMANY 2.5 5.5 
Iran’s total imports in 2013 = $45.58 billion  
 
While Turkey was 17th in Iran’s imports in 1999 with $227.6 million, it ranked 
fourth in 2013 with 4.19 billion.292 Moreover, while Turkey ranked fourth in Iran’s 
exports in 1999 with $198.62 million, it became the second largest country in Iran’s 
290 Trademap, “Trade Statistics for International Business Development,” http://www.trademap.org/
Country_SelProductCountry.aspx. 
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exports in 2013 with $10.38 billion.293 The balance of trade has always been in favor of 
Iran because Turkey is highly dependent on Iran in terms of oil and natural gas, and the 
majority of its imports from Iran have been these products. When oil and natural gas are 
excluded, the trade volume between Turkey and Iran is very low in comparison to other 
states.294 
b. Turkish Companies Investments in Iran 
Due to the sanctions against Iran, Turkey’s construction companies had to pay a 
heavy price. Although they made contracts with Iran and started their projects, sanctions 
forced them to discontinue their work.295 Turkey sought to prevent sanctions on Iran to 
take part in the construction of its infrastructure through multinational companies. For an 
overview of these contractor project values between 2004 and 2012, see Table 4 and 
Figure 2. 
Table 4.   Turkey’s Building Contractor Services in Iran between 2004 and 
2012.296  






77 40 215 17 442 45.7 933 76 1855 
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296 TUIK, Foreign Trade Statistics, Accessed on February 28, 2014, http://www.tuik.gov.tr/
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Figure 2.  Value of Turkish Building Companies’ New Projects in Iran between 
2004 and 2012.297 
c. Tourism 
Tourism is an important source of income for Turkey. Due to sanctions, from 
2010 to 2013 there was a substantial decrease in the number of Iranian tourists who 
visited Turkey. While there were around 1.885 million Iranian tourists who visited 
Turkey in 2010, this number decreased by 36.5 percent and became 1.196 million in 2013 
(Figure 3).298 Sanctions had a negative impact on the standard of life in Iranian society, 
which prevented them from visiting other states.299 As one of the main destinations for 
Iranian tourists, Turkey sought to prevent great powers from imposing sanctions on Iran 
by solving the issue with diplomacy. On November 2013, when Iran and the great powers 
made a temporary agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, which partly lifted sanctions, 
travel agents and hotels in Turkey reported that there was a remarkable increase in 
297 TUIK, “Foreign Trade Statistics,” http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt_id=1046. 
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bookings from Iranian tourists.300 The impact of the temporary softening the sanctions on 
tourism is important to understand the sanctions’ negative effects on tourism in Turkey. 
 
Figure 3.  Change in Number of Iranian Tourists who Visited Turkey from 
2010 to 2013.301 
Table 5 provides a year-by-year comparison of the change in the number of 
Iranian tourists who visited Turkey between 2010 and 2013. 
Table 5.   Change in Number of Iranian Tourists who Visited Turkey from 














RATE TO TOTAL VISITORS  
OF TURKEY (%) 
2010 1.885 36.28 6.58 
2011 1.889 -0.31 5.97 
2012 1.186 -36.87 3.73 
2013 1.196 0.88 3.43 
300 Yeliz Candemir and Joe Parkinson. “Turkey Expects Boon to Trade With Iran from Nuclear Deal 
Easing Sanctions.” Wall Street Journal, November 28, 2013. 




                                                 
2. Turkey’s High Dependency on Foreign States for Oil and Natural Gas 
A potential crisis, such as imposing new sanctions on Iran or war between Iran 
and the West, may increase petroleum prices in the world. Since Turkey is highly 
dependent on foreign states for oil and natural gas, this kind of situation would raise the 
current account deficit of Turkey.303 Thus, by engaging in the nuclear deal with Iran, 
Turkey attempted to prevent a potential crisis or war, which would have had serious 
impacts on its economy. 
Iran has the fourth largest proved oil reserves and the second largest natural gas 
reserves in the world.304 According to the data from OPEC in 2010, the proven crude oil 
reserve of Iran is 151.17 billion barrels.305 Having huge reserves of oil and important oil 
producing capacity make Iran an important actor in determining the crude oil price. 
According to a report from the IMF, the crude oil prices can rise up to 30 percent if Iran 
stops its oil exports completely as a result of the sanctions.306 
Turkey is paying more than $60 billion per year for energy imports. If the deal 
was successful, Iran would increase daily production of oil that might reduce oil prices. 
Considering that sanctions on Iran caused a 10 percent increase in oil prices so far, a 
decrease in oil prices would reduce Turkey’s current account deficit around $6 billion per 
year.307  
3. Turkey’s Aims to be an Energy Bridge between East and West 
Finding secure energy sources and establishing permanent supply are two of the 
main concerns of many countries that lack necessary natural resources and are highly 
dependent on other states. As the Caspian and Middle East region have a significant 
303 Abdurrahman Yildirim. “Anlaşma En Cok Türkiye’ye Yarar,” [An Agreement Would Mostly be to 
the Advantage of Turkey] HaberTurk, November 26, 2013.  
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Reuters, January 25, 2012. 
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amount of energy resources, such as oil and natural gas, establishing secure energy lines 
with these regions increased in importance in the 21st century.308 
Turkey’s geographical position constitutes a linkage point between east and west. 
As a natural geographic bridge, Turkey is the door between Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, 
Turkmenistan and Europe. Its success in energy projects such as the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil 
pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas 
pipeline contributed to its reputation and strengthened its place as reliable energy partner 
for European Countries.309 As a result of this partnership, Turkey is considered the most 
feasible and viable route for energy transportation both in political and economic terms 
for transporting energy sources from Iran, Iraq, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, to the 
West.310   
Turkey’s geostrategic position, its secure political and economic environment, 
and Western dependency on energy sources are important factors to understand Turkey’s 
significance as a potential energy bridge. Peace between Iran and the West would make 
Iran an important energy exporting country and contribute enormously to energy supply, 
which would definitely strengthen Turkey’s role as an energy bridge. Lifting the 
sanctions imposed on Iran would boost its return to the world trade and oil market, which 
would turn Turkey into a significant player in the energy market. Thus, the potential 
economic benefits of being an energy bridge between East and West was the third 
economic reason that made the deal significant for Turkey. 
C. CONCLUSION 
In sum, the 2010 Iran-Turkey-Brazil nuclear deal was both politically and 
economically significant for Turkey. The deal was politically significant for Turkey 
because it was seen as an important step by Turkish policy makers to maintain the newly 
adopted foreign policy perspective and to continue in the way of being a regional and 
308 Cenk Pala. “Turkey: Energy Bridge between East and West,” Journal of Middle Eastern 
Geopolitics 2, no. 4 (2007): 58.   
309 Tuncay Babali. “The Role of Energy in Turkey's Relations with Russia and Iran,” CSIS, March 29, 
2012, 6. http://csis.org/files/attachments/120529_Babali_Turkey_Energy.pdf. 
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global power. With the election of the AKP in 2002, Turkey has dramatically changed its 
foreign policy perspective and revised its goals in the international order. It started to 
strive for regional and global leadership and designed its foreign policy according to this 
goal. Turkey left passive, reaction-based approaches and began to follow more active 
policies. To reinforce its regional leadership role and to show continuity in its new 
foreign policy perspective, Turkey attempted to take over a mediator role in the deal. The 
deal was also politically significant for Turkey because Turkey considered it as an 
important opportunity to move one step further in its historical rivalry with Iran. 
Although there has been no armed conflict between Turkey and Iran since 1823, both 
states have been struggling for regional leadership for a long time. There are very few 
examples that they agreed on and acted together in history. So, Iran’s success in solving 
the nuclear issue on its own could decrease Turkey’s importance in the eyes of great 
powers as a strategic ally and provide a significant advantage for Iran in its struggle with 
Turkey for regional leadership. Finally, the deal was politically significant for Turkey 
because a nuclear Iran was a big threat for regional stability, which was an important goal 
for Turkey to realize its global leadership ambitions.  
According to Turkey, nuclear Iran would destabilize the region in two ways. First, 
it may start a nuclear arm race in the Middle East; second, it may lead the great powers, 
particularly the United States, to intervene militarily. Both cases would have negative 
impacts on Turkey in terms of its politics and economy. In addition, the deal was 
economically significant for Turkey because of the negative impacts of the Iranian 
sanctions on Turkey. Sanctions impact Turkish-Iranian economic relations in three 
aspects. First, they reversed the increasing pattern in bilateral trade and decreased the 
trade volume. Second, due to sanctions, Turkish multinationals could not enter Iranian 
market and increase their investments there. Third, sanctions weakened Iranian society 
economically, which resulted in a remarkable decrease in Iranian tourism to Turkey. The 
deal was also economically significant for Turkey because Iran is one of the main 
suppliers of oil and natural gas; a potential crisis or war might considerably increase oil 
prices. Since Turkey is highly dependent on foreign states for oil and natural gas, a rise in 
oil prices would increase the current account deficit of Turkey. Finally, the deal was 
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economically significant for Turkey because tension between Iran and the West 
prevented Turkey from taking advantage of its geographical position in the energy 
market. If Turkey could solve the issue, it would have been an energy bridge between 
East and West that would have huge contributions to its economy.  
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V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 2010 IRAN-TURKEY-BRAZIL 
NUCLEAR DEAL FOR BRAZIL 
Iran’s nuclear program has been one of the most controversial and polarized 
topics within the field of international relations since 1979.311 Although the United States 
and other European states were the main players in establishing nuclear facilities in Iran 
during the 1950s and 1960s, after the regime change in Iran in 1979, they—particularly 
the United States—began to strongly oppose the nuclear program of Iran.312 Starting with 
the hostage crisis in 1979, the relationship between Iran and the United States was 
broken.313 From that time on the United States has tried to deter Iran from continuing its 
nuclear program with economic sanctions. Until the end of the 20th century, almost all 
sanctions were unilateral and devoid of multilateral support.314 Moreover, they caused 
friction between the United States and other states including China, Russia, EU members, 
and Japan, because they were disproportionate and not based on solid grounds.315 
Considering China and Russia’s opposition until 21st century, the United States did not 
look for UN approval to impose sanctions on Iran.316 However, the discovery of the 
uranium enrichment facility with the support of an opposition group in Natanz and a 
water production facility in Arak in 2002 changed the approach of opposing countries, 
particularly EU states, and brought them closer to the United States, which wanted to 
bring the issue to the UN Security council.317 Although Iran seemingly stepped back for a 
while against international pressure, it toughened its stance after the election of 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 and resumed its uranium enrichment at Natanz in 2006, 
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312 “Blasts from the Past: Western Support for Iran's Nuclear Program,” Iran Affairs, May 30, 2006. 
http://www.iranaffairs.com/iran_affairs/2006/05/blasts_from_the.html. 
313 Uzun. “Economic Sanctions on Iran: Is It Iran’s Nuclear Program or the Government Getting 
Fragile?” 66. 
314 Richard N. Haas, ed., Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy (New York: Council of 
Foreign Relations Book, 1998), 85.   
315 Ibid., 90.   
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which motivated the IAEA to bring the issue to the UN Security Council.318 From 2006 
to 2009, the UN Security Council adopted five resolutions against Iran: in July 2006, 
Res.1696; in December 2006, Res.1737; in March 2007, Res.1747; in March 2008, 
Res.1803; and in September 2008, Res.1835.319 
Despite measures taken by great powers, Iran continued to develop its nuclear 
program and increased its supply of low-enriched uranium (LEU).320 If it could enrich its 
LEU to 85 percent, it could transform it into high-enriched uranium (HEU) that could be 
used to produce a nuclear warhead.321 Iran needed around 25‒50 kg of high-enriched 
uranium, which could be converted from 1300 kg of low-enriched uranium, to 
manufacture a warhead and by the middle of 2009 it gathered more than 1500 kg of 
LEU.322 These developments increased the concerns of the great powers. However, in 
June 2009, Iran notified the IAEA that it was looking for fuel pads for its Tehran 
Research Reactor (TRR), a medical reactor considered by permanent members of the UN 
Security Council and Germany as a tacit message for negotiating its nuclear program.323 
Considering this attempt an olive branch, the United States, other permanent members of 
the UN Security Council, and Germany began to prepare an offer that would satisfy both 
sides. Knowing that directly requesting a suspension from Iran did not work, the United 
States focused on taking “confidence-building measures.”324 Based on this idea, during 
the preparation period, the United States wanted to benefit from Brazil’s increasing 
relations with Iran and sent its diplomats to Brasilia to get Brazil’s support in convincing 
Iran to accept the nuclear agreement.325 In October 2009, Iran in principle accepted 
P5+1’s offer according to the following:  
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• Iran exports 1,200 kilograms of LEU in a single batch before the end 
of the 2009. 
• Russia further enriches Iran’s LEU to about 20%, a process producing 
about 120 kilograms of 20%-enriched uranium for the TRR fuel rods. 
• France manufactures the TRR fuel rods for delivery about one year 
after the conclusion of the agreement, prior to the depletion of the 
current TRR fuel supply. 
• The United States works with the IAEA to improve safety and control 
implementation at the TRR.326 
However, due to domestic opposition, Iran finally refused the deal, and this attempt 
ended with failure.327  
On March 2010, Hillary Clinton, the U.S. Secretary of State, paid a visit to Brazil 
to negotiate Iran’s nuclear issue. Moreover, in April, Recep Tayyip Erdogan along with 
Lula da Silva met with Barack Obama in the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, 
DC and discussed engaging a new deal with Iran. One week later, Obama sent a letter to 
Brazil’s president regarding the potential deal with Iran, which was considered by 
Brazilian officials as an indicator of U.S. readiness to engage in a deal with Iran under the 
same conditions of the deal of 2009.328 
After long negotiations, on May 17, 2010, Brazil, along with Turkey, managed to 
convince Iran to agree to a nuclear deal under the same conditions as the one on October 
2009.329 Most of the world press announced the deal as unprecedented and an indicator 
of Brazil and Turkey’s success as rising powers.330 However, due to the concern of the 
great powers, including the United States, Europe, and Russia, that the deal was “a deftly 
timed attempt to throw the sanctions effort off track,”331 the deal failed. Later on, Celso 
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Amorim, the Brazilian foreign minister of the time, surprisingly declared that both Brazil 
and Turkey engaged in the deal because the United States wanted them to do so.332 His 
revelation seemed to weaken the consideration of Turkey and Brazil as significant global 
players. Moreover, it ostensibly decreased the significance of the deal for Brazil and 
Turkey. However, this chapter argues that the nuclear deal with Iran was a win-win game 
designed in a way to benefit both the United States and Brazil in different ways. The 
United States used Brazil and Turkey as a tool to strengthen its hand to legitimize 
sanctions both inside and outside of the country. It not only punished Iran but also limited 
its influence over it by imposing unilateral sanctions. Until recently, the United States’ 
sanctions failed to secure multilateral support, which increased Iran’s resistance against 
U.S. measures.333 Although the United States could partly affect the Iranian economy 
through sanctions, it failed to completely isolate Iran from the world.334 Iran continued to 
take advantage of the division in the UN Security Council and world public opinion to 
evade the destroying impacts of sanctions.335 Russia, for instance, had an important trade 
and nuclear collaboration with Iran that diminished the effects of sanctions.336 By using 
different actors, like Brazil and Turkey, the United States attempted to show that Iran was 
not open to any diplomatic enterprise and sanctions were the best way to solve the issue. 
If Iran had refused the deal, the United States would have convinced the opponents of 
sanctions both inside and outside, which would have decreased domestic pressure and 
increased the impacts of sanctions. Brazil accepted to take part in this deal because the 
deal suited its political and economic interests. The deal was politically significant for 
Brazil because it also has nuclear motivations. It signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) with hesitation in 1998337 and continues to oppose nonproliferation 
measures at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) level by not signing 
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additional protocol.338 In defending Iran, Brazil was in part defending its own position 
regarding nuclear safeguards, IAEA inspections, militarized nuclear programs, and 
nuclear autonomy.339 Second, Brazil prioritized its relations with Asian, African, and 
Middle Eastern states during the Lula da Silva Era. So, by defending Iran, Brazil tried to 
strengthen its position in the eyes of these states that believed that the world order should 
change. Third, Brazil has historically supported diplomatic solutions to international 
disputes. As a requirement of this policy, it opposed sanctions. Fourth, by accepting the 
demand of the United States, Brazil avoided a direct confrontation with the United States 
that did not serve its interests. When it comes to economic significance, Brazil tried to 
kill three birds with one stone by engaging in this deal. First, trying to prevent sanctions 
against Iran meant supporting its economic interests because Brazil had an increasing 
economic relationship with Iran, which was threatened by sanctions.340 Second, Iran was 
in the group of states like China and Russia that also criticized the current unipolar 
system. So, by supporting Iran, Brazil attempted to consolidate its economic relations 
with other parts of the world. Third, by accepting the U.S. request to engage in the deal, 
Brazil sought not to endanger its economic relations with the United States. 
A. POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
1. Nuclear Reasons: Brazil Defended Its Own Position 
One of the main political reasons that made the deal significant for Brazil was 
Brazil’s nuclear ambitions. The nuclear deal was important for Brazil because by 
defending Iran, Brazil was defending its own position in nuclear issues. In other words, 
Brazil wants to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes and to avoid being subjected to 
the same policies by the United States and the United Nations (UN).341 It aimed to bring 
the issue to the public agenda and show the double-standard of the great powers.342 In 
338 “Nuclear Weapons Programs,” Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/brazil/
nuke.htm. 
339 Kassenova, Brazil's Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity, 82. 
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2010, Brazil claimed that the nonproliferation regime was unfair, for it only serves 
nuclear countries and it applies disproportionate pressure over non-nuclear-states.343 
According to Brazil, the difference between U.S. attitudes toward Iran and other states 
such as Israel and India is obvious evidence of this injustice.344 For instance, although 
India developed nuclear bombs in 1974 and 1998 and it did not sign NPT, the United 
States made an agreement with India in 2008 “to sell nuclear fuel, technology, and 
reactors to New Delhi for peaceful energy.”345 Moreover, Brazil argues that great powers 
arbitrarily use the Nonproliferation Treaty as an instrument to suppress weak states.346  
Brazil’s first serious attempt to develop nuclear technology dates back to the early 
1950s.347 It has approximately 5 percent of the total uranium reserves of the world and 
wants to take advantage of this prosperity.348 The regime change in 1964 accelerated 
Brazil’s efforts and its nuclear works peaked between 1964 and 1985.349 Although Brazil 
claimed to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes, foreign nuclear experts of the time 
believed that it sought to develop atomic weapons through its nuclear programs, 
particularly between the 1970s and early 1990s.350 In 1975, for instance, Brazil signed a 
nuclear deal with West Germany to get necessary technical support, which some Western 
states considered as an attempt to develop atomic bombs. Brazil’s refusal to sign the NPT 
and Tlatelolco agreements, its rivalry with Argentina and its regime of military 
dictatorship strengthened concerns in the international arena. However, economic 
conditions of the time prevented Brazil from reaching its ambitions of using nuclear 
343 Ibid. 
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345 Arturo C. Sotomayor,“Brazil and Mexico in the Non-proliferation Regime,” The Nonproliferation 
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energy.351 By the 1990s, due to the impact of the transition to democracy, Brazil joined 
the non-proliferation regime, but it continued to criticize the unjust structure of the 
regime.352  In 1991, it signed the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and 
Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).353 As a result of long discussions, Brazil 
accepted the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1994 and with hesitation became a full member of 
the NPT in 1998.354 A significant number of Brazilians opposed the signing of the deal 
arguing that it was a strategic mistake.355 Lula da Silva, presidential candidate of the 
Workers’ Party of the time, highly criticized the Cardozo government on the grounds that 
signing the NPT would only serve the interests of the great powers and support the unfair 
international order.356  
After the election of Lula da Silva, Brazil continued to have problems with the 
international non-proliferation regime. In 2004, he prevented IAEA inspectors from 
entering some parts of its nuclear reactor at Resende, which was under construction at 
that time, citing the need to defend “proprietary technological and commercial 
information.”357 He also re-established a military plan to produce nuclear-propelled 
submarines.358 Brazil wanted to produce nuclear-propelled submarines, because policy 
makers considered it a significant step in the way of national technological 
development.359 In the same period, Iran limited inspections in its nuclear facilities as 
well. To escape from being compared to Iran, Brazil preferred to postpone the 
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inauguration of Resende for a short period of time.360 IAEA members and Brazil reached 
an agreement in November 2004 and Brazil completed and opened its Resende nuclear 
facility to enrich uranium for commercial purposes on May 6, 2006.361 However, these 
developments did not change Brazil’s opposition to the IAEA, for it was desperately in 
need of nuclear power to solve its energy shortage problem.362 Brazil is highly dependent 
on hydro-resources to meet its electricity requirements.363 Hydro-resources constitute 
more than 80 percent of its electricity production while gas constitutes 6 percent, biomass 
and waste constitute 6 percent, and nuclear only constitutes 3 percent.364 In 2008, Brazil 
declared that it would not sign the IAEA’s Additional Protocol unless nuclear-states 
“have made progress towards nuclear disarmament.”365 In Brazil, there are currently two 
nuclear power reactors in operation, ANGRA 1, and ANGRA 2. A third one, ANGRA 3, 
is scheduled to be operational as of December 2015.366 
2. The Prioritization of Relations with Asian, African, and Middle 
Eastern States 
A second political reason that made the nuclear deal significant for Brazil was 
Brazil’s priority of relations with other parts of world in the 21st century. With the 
election of Lula da Silva in 2003, Brazil had begun to prioritize its relations with Asian, 
African, and Middle Eastern states.367 Brazil has since made this focus concrete through 
multi-lateral networks such as: BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), 
an economic group; IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa,) an emerging democratic powers’ 
group; BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China), a group regarding climate change; 
G77, group of developing countries; MERCOSUR, a regional common market 
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established in 1991 with Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay; and UNASUR, the 
Union of South American Nations. The common denominator of these groups is 
criticizing the injustice of the current system. Central to Brazil’s claim to take part in 
these groups is being the voice of aggrieved states against this inequality.368 According to 
Brazil, “the global nuclear order is a microcosm of the global world order.”369 By 
defending Iran, Brazil tried to strengthen its position in the eyes of these states that 
believed that the world order should change.370 On the other hand, Brazil’s prioritization 
of its relations with Asian, African, and Middle Eastern states, particularly in the Lula da 
Silva era, at the expense of its relations with developed world can be explained by Roman 
general and statesman Julius Caesar’s psychology: “I had rather be first in a village than 
second at Rome.” As a result of long term exclusion by the great powers from critical 
decision-making positions, such as permanent membership in the UN Security Council, 
Brazil turned its face from the developing world and tried to increase its relations with 
them in the 21st century. As a result of this change, during that period it opened more 
than thirty new embassies all around the world.371 Brazil has currently 34 embassies in 
African states and Lula da Silva made eleven official visits to this continent, comprising 
25 countries.372 
3. The Historical Legacy of Soft Power and Diplomacy  
Another significant political aspect of the nuclear deal for Brazil was its historical 
legacy of diplomacy. Brazil has constantly favored the use of diplomacy throughout 
history.373 It has always intended to be seen as a soft power state that reaches its goals 
through peaceful solutions instead of brute force.374 Brazilian decision makers have put 
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this perspective in their federal constitution to arrange their foreign relations. According 
to Article 4 of their constitution, “national independence, prevalence of human rights, 
self-determination of peoples, non-intervention, equality among states, defense of peace, 
peaceful conflict resolution, rejection of terrorism and racism, cooperation among 
peoples for the progress of humanity and concession of political asylum,” are the leading 
principles of Brazil in its foreign relations.375 As a requirement of this perspective, Brazil 
opposed sanctions and supported Iran’s right to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes. 
Considering that Brazil’s last war in the region was against Paraguay in the 1860s, it is 
possible to see diplomacy’s significance for Brazil in international relations.376 As a 
temporary member of the Security Council in 2010 and 2011, Brazil’s efforts against the 
United Nations’ interventionist resolutions towards Libya and Syria were the two latest 
examples that showed Brazil’s adherence to soft power measures.377 Moreover, 
encouraged by long-term diplomatic experience, Brazilian diplomats believe that they 
have a unique ability in reconciling different groups, so President Lula da Silva hoped to 
“showcase Brazil’s unique ability to convene opposing parties.”378 
4. Avoiding Direct Confrontation 
The other political aspect of the nuclear deal for Brazil was directly related to 
U.S.-Brazil relations. Although it was believed at first that Brazil and Turkey engaged in 
the deal on their own, the Brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim’s statements revealed 
that the United States wanted them to do so.379 Brazil historically has the policy of non-
confrontation with the United States.380 Throughout history, both states sporadically 
experienced tensions, but never confrontation.381 By accepting the demand of the United 
States, Brazil avoided a direct confrontation that did not serve its interests. In this case 
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Brazil behaved opportunistically, which “reflected the contradictions inherent in its 
approach to international relations.”382 While it has tried to strengthen its position in the 
developing world by criticizing the existing international order, it has maintained good 
relations with the United States. This two-faced policy best serves its economic interests. 
B. ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE 
The economy has been one of the main determinants in the formation of Brazil’s 
foreign policy throughout history. Since the early 20th century, considering economic 
interests has been a prerequisite before taking steps in foreign policy. Brazil’s 
engagement in the nuclear deal with Iran is an example of continuity in this perception. 
The nuclear deal with Iran had three different aspects for Brazil in terms of its economic 
significance. First, Brazil attempted to prevent sanctions that had a negative impact on its 
economic relations with Iran. Second, by appearing to defend Iran, Brazil attempted to 
reinforce its position in the eyes of developing world, which played a key role in its 
economic increase in the 21st century. Third, by doing what the United States wanted it 
to do, Brazil sought not to endanger its economic relations with the United States. 
Although its words contradicted with its deeds, this was a requirement for one of its 
foreign policy principles: pragmatism. 
1. Brazil’s Economic Relations with Iran 
Brazil’s formal relations with Iran date back to the beginning of the 20th century. 
After the signing of the Cultural Cooperation Agreement in 1957, both states have made 
46 more agreements in the fields of economy, trade, science, and education.383 Both 
states’ economic relations peaked in the 21st century. However, the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) started to inspect charges of Iran’s secret nuclear activities in 
2002 and concluded that Iran violated the IAEA safeguards agreement. It brought the 
issue to the United Nation Security Council in 2006, which approved six more resolutions 
382 Trinkunas, “Brazil’s Rise: Seeking Influence on Global Governance,” 22. 
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until 2014, including resolutions in 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013.384 
Resolution 1929385 was accepted right after the 2010 nuclear deal on June 2010.386 These 
resolutions had a negative impact on trade volumes in Brazil and Iran, which made the 
deal economically significant for Brazil.387 Before the 2010 deal with Iran, Brazil signed 
“a series of trade deals that are expected to increase bilateral trade between their countries 
to about $10 billion.”388 
a. An Overview of Brazil-Iran Economic Relations Since 1994 
As shown in Table 6 and Figure 4, Brazil’s economic relations increased very 
much in the 21st century and reached their peak in 2010 and 2011. However, these 
relations experienced significant decreases, particularly right after the UN Security 
Council’s resolutions against Iran. Although some other factors, such as the 2008 
economic crisis, played important roles in these decreases, the UN Security Council’s 
resolutions impact is undeniable. 
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Table 6.   An Overview of Brazil-Iran Economic Relations since 1994.389 
 




                                                 
 
Figure 4.  An Overview of Brazil-Iran Economic Relations since 1994.390 
Food ranks first in Brazil’s exports to Iran. Brazil became Iran’s largest provider 
of beef in 2011. Moreover, in Lula’s first year in office in 2003, Iran made an agreement 
with the Brazilian state-owned oil company Petrobras for an off-shore exploration 
privilege, which did not last because that area of exploration was not feasible for 
commercial investment. This agreement cost Brazil $178 million.391 
2. Brazil’s Economic Relations with China and other Parts of the World 
Especially from the second half of the 20th century, Brazil has tried to head the 
Third World to reorganize the international economic order.392 According to some 
analysts, these attempts, including the South-South foreign policy approach, prevents it 
from increasing its economic relations with the United States and the European Union 
because Brazilian policy makers believe that this kind of increase might have a negative 
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impact on Brazil’s relations with developing world.393 As a requirement for this 
perspective, supporting Iran against the United States and Europe would strengthen 
Brazil’s economic relations with other parts of the world. 
During the Lula da Silva era, Brazil had attempted to increase its economic and 
political relations with the developing world through different enterprises. The South-
South policy is one of those ventures, based on the idea that existing international 
financial and political organizations did not sufficiently represent the South.394 That was 
why India, Brazil, and South Africa established IBSA in 2003, which “covers a number 
of areas, from defense and energy to trade and health.”395 Moreover, Brazil, along with 
Russia, India, China, and South Africa, founded BRICS in 2009, which attempts to 
increase representation of its members in international financial organizations. Since the 
beginning of the 21st century, the deep interest of Asian states, particularly China, in 
Brazil’s commodities has helped Brazil strengthen its economy.396 While Brazil was not 
among the wealthiest economies of the world with around $203 billion in 1983, it became 
the world’s seventh largest economy with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $2.245 
trillion in 2013.397 While China ranked 12th among Brazil’s export partners in 2000 with 
around $1 billion and 1.8 percent share, it became Brazil’s first export partner in 2013 
with around $46 billion and 19 percent share.398 Table 7 shows Brazil’s top trading 
partners in 2013. 
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Table 7.   Brazil’s Top Trading Partners in 2013.399 
  Export(2013) Import(2013) 
    
Value 
(Million 
 Dollars) %   
Value 
(Million 
 Dollars) % 
1 China 46,026 19 China 37,302 15.6 
2 USA 24,866 10.3 USA 36,280 15.1 
3 Argentina 19,615 8.1 Argentina 16,463 6.9 
4 Netherland 17,326 7.1 Germany 15,182 6.3 
5 Japan 7,964 3.3 Nigeria 9,647 4 
 
Moreover, during the Lula da Silva era, Brazil increased its economic relations 
with other parts of the world through multinationals and government organizations. These 
groups spread to different parts of the world and began to work in the fields of 
telecommunication, technology, energy, food, agriculture, transportation, and mining, 
which returned as an input to the Brazilian economy.400 Some of the leading 
multinationals of Brazil that played a key role in economic boom in the 21st century are: 
Embraer, a commercial aircraft manufacturer operating in the United States, China, 
Portugal, Singapore, and France; Vale, metal and mining company, operating in all 
continents; Petrobras, oil company, operating in 27 countries including Angola, Benin, 
Gabon, Namibia, Nigeria, and Argentina; and Odebreacht, engineering and construction 
company, operating in particularly Africa.401 Thanks to these enterprises, for instance, 
Brazil increased its trade with Africa to $20.6 billion in 2013.402 Similarly, Brazil’s trade 
with MERCOSUR increased 86 percent, with Andean states 253 percent, and with 
Mexico 121 percent between 2000 and 2009.403 
399 “United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database,” http://comtrade.un.org/db/mr/
daReportersResults.aspx?bw=B. 
400 Lourdes Casanova and Julian Kassum, “Brazilian Emerging Multinationals: In Search of a Second 
Wind.” Faculty & Research Working Paper, 2013, 3. 
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3. Brazil’s Economic Relations with the United States 
Despite all of its criticism regarding the injustice of the international system, 
which is mainly dominated by the United States, Brazil continues to attach importance to 
its economic relations with the United States. That was why, by accepting the United 
States’ demand to engage in the 2010 deal, Brazil sought to strengthen its economic 
relations with the United States. The United States was the top trading partner of Brazil 
until 2009, when China unseated it from that position.404 However, it continues to be the 
second largest trade partner of Brazil (see Table 7).405 On the other hand, Brazil is also a 
significant trading partner for the United States. As of 2013, it is the seventh largest 
importer from the United States, at around $44.1 billion.406 
During Lula da Silva’s era, trade between Brazil and the United States increased 
threefold. Between 2006 and 2011, Brazil’s goods and service imports from the United 
States increased more than twofold from $26 billion to $62.7 billion. From 2002 to 2011, 
Brazil’s goods imports from the United States tripled from $12.4 billion to $42.9 billion. 
In the same period, Brazil’s service imports from the United States tripled, too, from  
$5.1 billion to $19.9 billion. By the end of 2010, Brazil’s capital investment in the United 
States was $15.5 billion, which made Brazil the leader of Latin America in terms of 
foreign direct investment (FDI). Between 2003 and 2012, Brazilian companies made 81 
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Some analysts argue that Brazil’s foreign and trade policies are so entwined that 
the Ministry of Foreign Relations is more effective than other agencies in shaping the 
country’s trade policies.408 Moreover, they believe that due to the dominance of the 
foreign ministry in trade policies, commercial interests are being sacrificed for the sake of 
foreign policies.409 In addition, they claim that, despite the fact that economic 
cooperation with the developed world would be more beneficial for Brazil in terms of its 
economy in the long run, Brazil has concentrated on strengthening its leadership position 
in MERCOSUR and improving its economic relations with Asian, African, and Middle 
Eastern countries to increase its international profile.410 Considering the trade volume 
between Brazil and the United States, these arguments do not reflect the truth. Although 
it is a fact that Brazil is afraid of offending its developing world allies by increasing its 
relations with the United States,411 it does not sacrifice the relationship with the United 
States in this cause. Instead, Brazil behaves opportunistically and tries to balance both 
sides.  
a. An Overview of Brazil-U.S. Economic Relations Since 1994   
As shown in Table 8 and Figure 5, Brazil’s economic relations with the United 
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Table 8.   An Overview of Brazil-US Economic Relations since 1994.412  
 
 




                                                 
 
Figure 5.  An Overview of Brazil-U.S. Economic Relations since 1994.413 
C. CONCLUSION 
The nuclear deal with Iran was both politically and economically significant for 
Brazil. It had four main political aspects: First, the deal overlapped with Brazil’s nuclear 
interests. Brazil had similar nuclear ambitions to Iran, which were restricted by the unfair 
non-proliferation regime. By engaging in the 2010 deal, it attempted to defend its 
position. Second, in the 21st century, Brazil increased its relations with the developing 
world by arguing against the injustice of the existing international order. By defending 
Iran, Brazil tried to strengthen its position in the eyes of its new allies. Third, Brazil has a 
historical legacy of solving disputes through diplomacy. As a requirement of this legacy, 
it sought to prevent the United Nation Security Council from imposing sanctions against 
Iran. Fourth, Brazil adopted the principle of non-confrontation with the United States 
throughout its history. It took part in the deal because the United States urged it to do so. 
By fulfilling the request of the United States, Brazil attempted to not to confront with the 
United States and strengthen relations with it. In addition, the deal had three main 
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the resolutions of the UN affected these relations negatively. Second, in the 21st century, 
Brazil has been developing its economic relations with other parts of the world that have 
been critical of the existing system. So, by taking part in the deal, Brazil attempted to 
reinforce its relations with these states. Third, although Brazil allegedly criticizes the 
international order, which is mainly governed by the United States, the United States 
continues to be one of the largest trade partners of Brazil. So, by joining the 2010 deal 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Iran’s nuclear program has been considered as one of the primary threats against 
the regional balance of power policies in the Middle East since the Iranian Islamic 
Revolution in 1979. Although Western powers, particularly the United States, played 
important roles in introducing nuclear power to Iran in the 1950s and 1960s, after the 
regime change in Iran in 1979, they have become the main opponents of its nuclear 
program due to security concerns. Their concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear intentions 
increased in the mid-1990s and peaked in 2002 with the discovery of nuclear facilities in 
Natanz and Arak.414 Until then, there was not a consensus in the world about Iran as a 
nuclear threat. That was why the United States was the unique power that tried to deter 
Iran from its nuclear program through active measures, such as sanctions, without 
securing the United Nation’s support. However, the discovery of nuclear facilities in 
2002 helped the United States to convince other main actors that have a voice in 
international issues, such as the European Union. From 2002 to 2009, all attempts, 
including the UN Security Council’s adoptions of resolutions against Iran and diplomatic 
initiatives, failed to prevent Iran from developing its nuclear program due to Iran’s 
resistance and both parties’ mutual distrust. When the issue came to a deadlock and there 
was no belief in diplomacy for solving the problem, the world saw a sudden light at the 
end of the tunnel. To the world’s surprise, on May 17, 2010, two emerging powers, 
Turkey and Brazil, convinced Iran to negotiate its nuclear program and signed an 
agreement with it. Due to the skepticism of the great powers, particularly the United 
States, Britain, France, and Germany, regarding Iran’s secret intentions and their opinion 
that Iran was playing for time, the deal ended with failure. However, it continued to be 
politically and economically significant for Turkey and Brazil.  
There were three main political and three main economic elements of the deal for 
Turkey. The deal was politically significant for Turkey because Turkish policy makers 
considered it an important step to be a global power and to show continuity in their newly 
414  Gurzel and Ersoy, “Turkey and Iran’s Nuclear Program,” 40. 
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established foreign policy perspective. In the transition from empire to republic in 1923, 
Turkey modified its foreign policy goals and downsized its ambitions from a global level 
to the point of just aiming to protect the borders of the nation-state and maintaining its 
presence. From its establishment in 1923 to the end of the Cold War, the Republic of 
Turkey adopted passive and reactive foreign policies and tried to protect the status quo. 
However, the end of the Cold War marked the beginning of new era for Turkey when 
Turkish policy makers began to question old approaches and aim at regional and global 
leadership. With the election of the AKP government in 2002, Turkey has begun to 
materialize its global ambitions through active policies and signaled a return to the 
powerful days of the Ottoman Empire. It left passive and reactive policy perceptions and 
started to have a voice over international issues. As a requirement for this new policy 
perspective and increasing its leadership profile, the nuclear deal was an important 
opportunity for Turkey. The deal was also politically significant for Turkey because it 
was an important event in the historical Turkish-Iranian rivalry for regional leadership. If 
Iran had solved the issue on its own, it would become a strategic ally of the great powers 
in the region, which would undermine Turkey’s regional leadership goals. By being a 
part of solution, Turkey attempted to prevent Iran from increasing its profile in the eyes 
of the great powers. Finally, the deal was politically significant for Turkey because 
Turkey considered a nuclear Iran a big threat to its security and the regional balance.  
According to Turkey, a nuclear Iran might stimulate a nuclear arms race in the 
region and encourage the United States to intervene militarily. Both scenarios would have 
serious negative impacts on Turkey. In addition, there were three main economic reasons 
that made the deal significant for Turkey. First, sanctions had negative impacts on 
Turkey-Iran economic relations, such as the trade volume, Turkish multinational 
investments in Iran, and tourism. Turkey sought to solve the nuclear disagreement to 
increase its economic relations with Iran in all fields and to effectively take part in 
Iranian market. Second, a tension between Iran and other states caused an increase in oil 
and natural gas prices. Since Turkey is highly dependent on foreign states for these items, 
the increase in prices meant an increase in the budget deficit. So, Turkey tried to prevent 
any tension in the region to keep oil and natural gas prices under control. Third, due to 
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sanctions, Turkey could not take advantage of its geography as an energy bridge. The 
solution of the problem would boost Iran’s oil production and turn Turkey into an energy 
bridge between the East and West, which meant a remarkable income for Turkey.  
When it comes to Brazil, there were four main political and three main economic 
reasons that made the deal significant for Brazil. First, the deal was politically significant 
for Brazil because Brazil also had nuclear motivations. By defending Iran, Brazil sought 
to defend its own position regarding nuclear safeguards, IAEA inspections, militarized 
nuclear programs, and nuclear autonomy. The second political significance of the deal 
was that Brazil considered it an important tactic to strengthen its position in the eyes of 
Asian, African, and Middle Eastern states, which was important for its newly established 
foreign policy perspective in the 21st century. Third, Brazil historically supported the 
solution of international disputes through diplomacy. So, as a requirement for this 
perspective, it opposed sanctions and tried to bring Iran to the table to solve the issue 
through diplomacy. The fourth political aspect of the deal was Brazil’s historical non-
confrontation policy with the United States. Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim’s 
explanations in 2010 showed that the United States wanted Brazil to engage in the deal. 
So, by taking part in the deal, Brazil sought not to subvert their alliance with the United 
States. In addition, there were three main economic reasons that made the deal significant 
for Brazil. First, similar to Turkey, sanctions had negative impacts on Brazil’s increasing 
economic relations with Iran. By solving this issue, Brazil attempted to maintain the 
increasing pattern of its commercial relations with Iran. Second, since Iran was in line 
with the states that criticized the unfairness of the existing system, Brazil sought to 
reinforce its position in the eyes of those states by supporting Iran, which was significant 
for its economic interests. Third, economic relations with the United States were also 
essential for Brazil. By accepting the U.S. demand, it did not jeopardize its already 
increased economic relations with it.  
Iran’s nuclear program continues to be one of the most important topics in the 
international agenda. From the failure of the Turkey-Brazil-Iran nuclear deal in 2010 to 
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today, the UN Security Council adopted five more resolutions regarding the issue.415 In 
2013, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, known for his overt hostility towards Israel and the 
United States, handed over the presidency to Hassan Rouhani, known as being more 
moderate in foreign relations. Taking new steps to lift the sanctions and increasing the 
standard of living in Iranian society were two main promises of Hassan Rouhani in the 
inauguration ceremony.416 Under his presidency, Iran has made a temporary accord with 
the P5+Germany on November 2013 that entered into practice on January 20, 2014. 
Rouhani agreed to end the installation of the machines used for the purpose of uranium 
enrichment in exchange for easing the sanctions.417 Although this attempt was considered 
by the P5+Germany as an important step to solve the issue, both parties have failed to 
reach a permanent agreement so far.418  
 
  
415 United Nations. “Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1737 (2006),” 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1737/resolutions.shtml. 
416 “İran'da Ahmedinejad Dönemi Resmen Sona Erdi,” [Ahmedinejad Era Officially Ended in Iran] 
Haber7.com, August 3, 2013. 
417 “İran'la Nükleer Anlaşma 20 Ocak'ta Yürürlüğe Giriyor,” [The Nuclear Deal with Iran Will Enter 
into Force on January 20] BBC Turkce, January 13, 2014. 
418 “İran Ile Nükleer Görüşmelerde Anlaşma Yok,” [There is No Agreement in Nuclear Talks with 
Iran] BBC Turkce, November 24, 2014.  
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